Social Impact Bonds in Maryland

Social Impact Bonds in Maryland A report for the Maryland General Assembly, House Appropriations Committee December 1, 2013 Prepared by: The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, University of Maryland School of Social Work with The Division of Early Childhood Development, Maryland State Department of Education and The Social Impact Bond Workgroup The Division of Early Childhood Development, Maryland State Department of Education Prepared for: 1 This report was developed and produced by The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, University of Maryland School of Social Work with the Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE), Division of Early Childhood Development and the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, with funds from the U.S. Department of Education, Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge Grant (CFDA 84.412). Lillian M. Lowery, Ed.D. State Superintendent of Schools Charlene M. Dukes, Ed.D. President, State Board of Education Rolf H. Grafwallner, Ph.D. Assistant State Superintendent, Division of Early Childhood Development Martin O’Malley Governor Members of the Social Impact Bond Workgroup: Michelle Zabel, The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, Chair Nathan W. Bowen, Department of Budget & Management Dan Feller, Governor’s Office for Children Nancy Fitzgerald (for Marcella Franczkowski), Maryland State Department of Education Rolf Grafwallner, Maryland State Department of Education Jeanne-Marie Holly, Maryland State Department of Education Farid Keshavarz, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services Netsanet Kibret, Department of Human Resources Angela Lagdameo Cabellon, Department of Human Resources Ilise Marrazzo, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Delegate Samuel Rosenberg, Maryland General Assembly Miriam Shark, Annie E. Casey Foundation Terry Staudenmaier, Abell Foundation Margaret Williams, Maryland Family Network Albert Zachik, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Staff support for the Social Impact Bond Workgroup was provided by: • Deborah Harburger, MSW, The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, UM SSW • John V. Spears III, Ph.D., RESI of Towson University • Roann Tsakalas, Ph.D., Maryland State Department of Education Suggested citation: Harburger, D.S., Zabel, M., Tsakalas, R., Spears, J.V., Grafwallner, R. H., & Social Impact Bond Workgroup. (2013). Social Impact Bonds in Maryland [Report to the Maryland General Assembly, House Appropriations Committee]. Baltimore, MD: Maryland State Department of Education. 2 At the conclusion of the 2013 Maryland General Assembly Session, the Honorable Mary-Dulany James and the Honorable John Bohanan of the House Appropriations Committee issued a letter to Dr. Lillian M. Lowery requesting a review of the merits of issuing Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) in Maryland. This request came as a result of a Department of Legislative Services (DLS) analysis on SIBs as a possible financing mechanism for the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS). This analysis prompted the introduction of legislation on the development of SIBs in Maryland, which was ultimately withdrawn at the request of the sponsor. The request was for MSDE to, in partnership with other state entities, examine existing SIB models and the feasibility of implementing these models in Maryland, with the goal of fostering a better understanding of SIBs, including their functions and potential benefits for Maryland. Purpose & Introduction The Division of Early Childhood Development, led by Assistant State Superintendent Rolf Grafwallner, commissioned The Institute for Innovation & Implementation at the University of Maryland School of Social Work to chair and facilitate a SIB Workgroup and develop the report on the feasibility of SIBs in Maryland. Dr. Lowery invited representatives from multiple State Agencies as well as from the philanthropic and non-profit communities, private sector, and City of Baltimore to participate in the Workgroup. The Workgroup convened on three separate occasions from July 2013 through October 2013 to hear presentations from national experts on different facets of SIBs and discuss the merits and challenges of development and implementation of SIBs in Maryland. The goal for the first meeting was to provide an overview of SIBs and SIB projects. The second meeting was designed to help participants identify how SIBs are being measured, which savings go to investors, and which applications might work under the SIB model. The third and final meeting was designed to give participants the opportunity to hear about how the philanthropic community is getting involved in SIBs and to discuss the recommendations for this report. Notes from the meetings can be found in the appendix along with copies of the presentations from these meetings. Background on SIBs Pay for Success is a broad term used by the Obama Administration, among others, to describe innovative financing mechanisms that bring together public and private agencies and funders to create incentives for providers to achieve better outcomes at lower costs. Pay for Performance (P4P) is one Pay for Success contract type where financial incentives reward providers for achievement of a range of payer objectives, including delivery efficiencies, submission of data and measures to payer, and improved quality and patient safety (Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, 2012). Shared savings are a financial incentive whereby the payer and provider share any accrued savings, rather than the payer keeping all of the savings in a traditional, fee-for-service model. The alternative to a shared savings model is a risk-based contract, where an organization is paid a fixed amount for a defined set of benefits regardless of the quantity or intensity of services provided. There are multiple types of risk, including utilization, morbidity, demand, price, and beta risk (Oss, 2013). Under a risk-sharing agreement, the payer and provider share both the financial risks as well as the savings that may occur. The Pay for Success Toolkit SIBs are another type of financing mechanism within the Pay for Success toolkit. A SIB is a financing arrangement between the government and an external organization/intermediary. The government identifies the specific outcome (s) it wants to achieve related to a particular population over an identified period of time and agrees to pay the intermediary a pre-arranged sum if the organization achieves the desired outcome. The government does not contract for a particular intervention but rather for the outcome. The intermediary is responsible for contracting with service providers as well as obtaining investments from outside entities. If the outcome is achieved, the intermediary pays the investors a return on their money. The risk is held by the investor(s) and the intermediary, not the government, with the government only paying if the outcomes are achieved (Costa, Shah, Ungar, & The Social Impact Bonds Working Group, 2012; Spears, 2013). Godeke & Resner explain that the term SIB was “first used in the UK to describe a Pay-for-Success model in which the outcome performance risk was entirely transferred from government to investors....While earlier discussions have emphasized the full risk transfer of the outcome performance risk from government to investors as essential to the structure, future transactions, especially in the US context, are expected to encompass risk sharing” (2012, p.5). They also note that, despite the use of the word “bond,” a SIB is actually a multi-stakeholder partnership based on contracts; the government’s obligation to pay the investors is a contractual obligation and is “distinct from a general obligation, moral obligation or revenue bond”[emphasis added](Godeke & Resner, p.5). SIBs are a type of social venture that bring together for-profit and non-profit sectors for investment and are an example of the larger realm of new philanthropy that utilizes tools from the business sector in the human services arena. Foundations can function as philanthropic banks and serve as key actors as they bring along the requisite private investors (Salamon, 2013). This diagram depicts a typical SIB. In a SIB, the government sets the specific outcome it wants to achieve relative to a well-defined population over a given period of time and contracts with an intermediary to achieve this outcome. Investors provide the up-front capital to pay for the program Core Components of a SIB and an intermediary engages the service providers to deliver the interventions. An independent evaluator monitors the progress of the interventions and an independent researcher determines if the performance targets have been met. If the target is met, the government repays the investor the principal plus interest. There are variations on the design of the SIB, but the key players remain the same (Spears, 2013). Success under a SIB can mean cost avoidance (actual reductions in government operating costs due to the intervention) and outcome improvement. “Success payments” are used by the intermediary to pay interest and principle to investors and pay bonuses to providers who exceed expected performance levels (Dugger, 2013). Social Finance (Leventhal, 2013) lists the following five key steps to launching and implementing successful SIBs: 1) Originate the deal: identify government champions and savings opportunities; vet proven models of intervention; perform Costa, Shah & Ungar, 2012 3 nonprofit due diligence; and conduct financial modeling; 2) Secure government contract: develop and secure government contract; secure authorization for multi-year contract, including addressing appropriation risk; and formulate a partnership agreement with metrics and payment terms; 3) Structure the instrument: develop the operating model and structure the investment vehicle; articulate cash flows, including financial and social returns for target milestones; and finalize the methodology, including metrics and the evaluation strategy; 4) Raise capital: recruit investors (foundations and charitable trusts, high net-worth individuals and family offices, institutional investors) and issue the instrument and raise investment capital; and, 5) Manage the project over the instrument’s life: provide active ongoing project management and financial intermediation; make course corrections as needed; and, coordinate third-party evaluations. Social Finance US has identified three tiers of assessment criteria that can be used to evaluate the appropriateness of an intervention to a SIB: whether the intervention is evidence-based, if there are sufficient net savings within the time horizon, and if it is replicable and scalable. Social Finance has identified a series of promising applications for social impact bonds, including prisoner recidivism, juvenile justice, early education, and chronic homelessness (Leventhal, 2013). Social Finance US (2013) How are SIBs being used—or considered for use? 4 5 The only operational SIBs are found in Peterborough, England and New York City. The other activities described below are SIB designs that are in the process of being implemented, “pre-SIB” projects, or pilot projects intended to demonstrate the feasibility of entering into a SIB. Many states have or are introducing legislation related to SIBs, and Massachusetts is contracting to launch the financing for a SIB focused on juvenile justice and chronic homelessness (Leventhal, 2013). In the Social Impact Tribune, Goldberg (2013, p.1-2) observes: Peterborough All this buzz about SIBs isn’t just hype. There’s something potentially significant going on here, and a lot of smart, serious people are trying to make good things happen. But it’s really important to understand that we don’t really know how to do any of this yet. Even in the UK, where SIBs started and are well ahead of the US, there are still no published results of any kind from even the first pilot project launched at the Peterborough Prison in September, 2010. Preliminary reports suggest the project seems to be going well, with many lessons learned and refinements made along the way, but we won’t have any actual recidivism data until 2014. So we have no idea yet whether using SIBs to pay charities to meet released prisoners at the gate and provide them with comprehensive re-entry services reduces recidivism. And that’s the SIB project that’s the farthest along in the world. A table summarizing the current SIB and pre-SIB activities can be found in the appendix. The Peterborough SIB in the United Kingdom was launched in 2010. The UK Ministry of Justice contracted with Social Finance to raise capital, structure the financing, and serve as the program intermediary to achieve a 7.5% reduction in recidivism for former prisoners. In this SIB, there was an investment of £5 million by private investors. Social Finance UK funded and managed the proven re-entry programs through select service providers, with the services provided to 3,000 male short-term prisoners released from the Peterborough Prison. If the outcome of lower recidivism of the population served as compared to a control group is achieved, the UK Ministry of Justice and the Big Lottery Fund will pay the intermediary (Social Finance UK) based on predefined metrics. The intermediary will then pay back the investors at a predetermined rate over 8 years (Leventhal, 2013). The first payments under the Peterborough SIB are not due until 2014, so the success of the project remains to be seen. Detractors observe that neither the prisoners nor the prison itself were randomly selected for participation and that the data available from the Police National Computer (a national database of information available to police and law enforcement agencies throughout the United Kingdom) for the evaluation do not include such elements as mental health or substance abuse histories, which may impact recidivism (Fiennes, 2013). However, others note that the SIB is well-monitored and that the very structure of the SIB as a contract is an asset: “It is a contractual mechanism that ensures investors, commissioners and providers agree on outcomes and maintain constant communication about progress” (Blightly Britain, 2013, p.2). New York City (NYC) identified the problem that youth who enter jail as adolescents have a high likelihood of re-entering the system in the years after their release, with 50% of adolescents who leave Rikers Island returning within one year. NYC has created a SIB using Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE), which is an intervention based on cognitive behavioral therapy models (which are evidence-based) that works with 16-18 year olds while they are in jail and post release to improve social skills, problem solving, self-control, and impulse management. The budget for this project is $2.4 million annually for four years (Misner, 2013). New York City The partners in the NYC SIB are Goldman Sachs (funding the project’s delivery and operations through a $9.6 million loan to MDRC), Bloomberg Philanthropies (providing a grant to serve as a guarantee for Goldman Sachs for $7.2 million of investment), MDRC (a private organization responsible for managing daily operations, including oversight of the two service providers), The Vera Institute of Justice (independent evaluator), and the Department of Correction (pays MDRC based on reduced re-admissions). In this model, Goldman Sachs will receive the majority of its investment even if the savings do not accrue as a result of the guarantee fund from Bloomberg Philanthropies, which significantly decreases the risk for Goldman Sachs (Misner, 2013). If the project achieves greater than or equal to a 10% reduction in re-incarceration, the City payment to MDRC is $9.6 million—the breakeven point. The City payment to MDRC continues to rise at specified intervals based on increased reductions in re-incarceration until the maximum of 20%. If MDRC achieves a reduction in re-incarceration greater than or equal to 20%, the City will pay out $11.712 million. The estimated long-term net savings from this reduction is projected to be $20.5 million, not including the savings used to continue funding the program delivery for youth at Rikers. This SIB is just beginning, so no data are available on its success (Misner, 2013). Massachusetts is pursuing two SIBs—one focused on youth transitioning out of juvenile justice and probation systems and a second on the provision of stable housing for chronically homeless individuals. Intermediaries and service providers have been selected for both projects, known in Massachusetts as Social Innovation Financing programs. Massachusetts has a legislatively established $50 million trust fund (with portions appropriated over several years) to support outcome payments for the contracts. Unlike other models, Massachusetts entered into separate procurement processes for the intermediaries and the service providers rather than allowing the intermediaries to select the service providers themselves (Costa & Kholi, 2012; Gilroy, 2013). As Costa & Kholi observe, Massachusetts will need to ensure that the intermediaries have retained enough power to modify the interventions and make adjustments as necessary. If the intermediaries are unable to replace the services or service providers, the SIB may not be successful (Costa & Kholi; Gilroy). The California Endowment awarded Social Finance and Collective Health a grant to implement an asthma management and prevention program for 200 low-income children. The goal of this program is to improve the health of the children living with asthma and reduce costs from associated emergency room treatments and hospitalizations. In this pilot project, Social Finance is serving as the financial intermediary and Collective Health is the operational intermediary (Leventhal, 2013; Social Finance US, 2013). Two providers with track records in managing asthma will design and manage the program and a third partner will provide technical assistance. Under the project, families will receive home care, education, and support in reducing environmental triggers for asthma. (Social Finance US, 2013). If the project is successful, the partners will seek to create a SIB to serve a larger population (Leventhal, 2013). The United Way of Salt Lake City, Utah has received a combined loan of $7 million from Goldman Sachs ($4.6 million) and J.B. Pritzker ($2.4 million) for its Utah High Quality Preschool Program with the goal of reducing the need for special education services for participants. The project is built upon the investment of the Kellogg Foundation with the Granite School District to identify the outcomes of children served and the cost avoidance that occurs from the children not needing to receive special education services in elementary and secondary schools. Voices for Utah’s Children Massachusetts Fresno 6 Salt Lake City and The United Way are the intermediaries and the Granite School District is responsible for training, quality, and service provision. Utah State University will be evaluating the project and determining the specific quarterly payments over the 12- year term (Schoenberg, 2013). Goldman Sachs and Pritzker will receive 5% interest on their loans if it is successful, as well as specific fees (Alden, 2013). The partners in this SIB are referring to it as a “proof of concept” initiative. The Salt Lake County Council voted to contribute an additional $350,000 to the initiative (Eager, 2013). This occurred after the Utah State Legislature failed to approve financing to support the initiative. With the funds from the Council, the project will be able to serve up to 600 children, all of whom are below the federal poverty level (Schoenberg, 2013). SIBs are one of several technologies within the “new frontiers of philanthropy” that utilize a limited supply of social funding and leverage it to provide more human services. Although very important, grant funding is traditionally inefficient because, once the money is spent, it is gone and unable to be reinvested (Salamon, 2013). SIBs offer States and local governments the opportunity to partner with intermediaries and service providers to utilize evidence- based and –informed practices to serve target populations in a Excerpt of Infographic from the Rockefeller Foundation (Joseph, 2013) Benefits of SIBs 7 flexible manner to achieve stated goals. The States and local governments are not responsible for paying the full cost if the outcomes are not successful and are able to recoup additional monies to reinvest in program continuity if the outcomes are achieved. SIBs are a more sustainable model of financing that share the burden of funding across the public and private sectors. Although somewhat oversimplified, the infographic from the Rockefeller Foundation (Joseph, 2013) highlights the benefits of SIBs and why they are gaining momentum so quickly. No SIBs have been proven yet and the challenge will be in quantifying and capturing the savings to fund the returns to the investors (Salamon, 2013). The list of key steps for launching and implementing successful SIBs (p.4-5) illustrates the complexity of successfully designing and implementing a SIB, including the need for active risk management throughout the process (Leventhal, 2013). The complexity of structuring and managing a SIB does lead some to wonder why State governments do not simply fund the evidence-based practices themselves, for those interventions that have demonstrated cost savings in addition to improved outcomes (e.g. Nurse Family Partnership and Multi-Systemic Therapy, see Goldberg, 2013c). Challenges of SIBs In addition to the costs of the intervention itself, funding needs to be available to pay for the third- party evaluators to certify the project and monitor the results (Duggar, 2013). Also, with the high level of detail that must be addressed, a SIB will only be successful if it is matched to the right intervention and the necessary partners are all at the table. The intermediaries and service providers need to have sufficient flexibility to change the intervention to reach the identified outcome; governments and investors are purchasing an outcome, not a particular service intervention, which is a large shift for many governments. Additionally, private investors may be reluctant to participate in a SIB if they think there is a risk that the government might not pay the investors after the outcome is achieved or if they think the risk is too great or the scale too small (Goldberg, 2013a). Although many states have introduced or passed legislation relating to SIBs, few have gone beyond authorizing the Governor to sign a SIB contract. According to Goldberg (2013b, p. 12), legislation to establish a SIB would need to “(1) Authorize the SIB contract in which the government agrees to pay for certain outcomes; (2) Appropriate the money as of the payment due date; and (3) Make the appropriation irrevocable.” Only Massachusetts has passed such legislation, by obligating the Commonwealth’s full faith and credit up to a total of $50 million. In most instances, investors have been secured through a combination of grants and guarantees to mitigate the risk (Goldberg, 2013b). Workgroup Findings “Impact investing is going to involve a much bigger departure from business as usual than you think. Much bigger. There are pros and cons galore, and a new level of complexity that will try everyone’s patience.” Steve Goldberg (2013, p.3) The SIB Workgroup was fortunate to hear presentations from national experts on SIBs from multiple perspectives, including those of the intermediaries, government, funders, and technical assistance providers. After each of the meetings, SIB Workgroup participants were issued an anonymous, electronic survey for their completion. The survey was designed to serve as a straw poll to gauge interest in pursuing SIBs in Maryland and identify where participants had outstanding questions or concerns. 8 Survey respondents indicated that they were surprised to learn about the extent to which SIBs are being studied and implemented in various forms across the nation. Many noted that they now have a better understanding that a project must be the right fit for a SIB, including the timeframe for demonstrating results—ideally within 3-5 years. Others observed that there is a broad range of issues and types of investors that may be involved in SIBs, and that SIBs present a possible mechanism for bypassing policy or budget silos. Finally, several were interested to learn about the private and public funding that is being made available in some instances to guarantee the loans and reduce the risk for the investors. From the first survey after the July meeting to the second survey after the September meeting, the average rating for the feasibility of SIBs in Maryland increased very slightly. It also increased slightly from the second survey to the third survey at the beginning of October. Below is an excerpt with the survey results: Based on the information you have received to-date, on a scale of 1-10, do you think a SIB could work for Maryland in the next few years? (1=SIBs are not at all feasible or realistic for Maryland in the next few years; 10=SIBs could definitely be implemented in Maryland to implement in the next few years) 1st Survey Responses: 2nd Survey Responses: 3rd Survey Responses: Min Value Max Value 8.00                               1.86              9 8.00                             1.31            12 Standard Deviation Responses 3.00 Standard Deviation 8.00                               1.35              11 4.00 The second and third surveys asked respondents whether they were employees of a State Agency (DBM, DHMH, DHR, DJS, GOC, MSDE). The State Agency employees gave slightly higher ratings in the third survey than in the second survey, and there were more respondents in the third survey: Min Value Min Value 4.00 4.00 Max Value Max Value Average Value 4.83 Standard Deviation Responses Average Value 5.44 Standard Deviation Responses 2nd Survey Responses for State Agency Employees: 7.00                               1.17              6 8.00                           1.42            9 The non-State Agency employees (5 in the first survey, 3 in the second survey), gave the following 3rd Survey Responses for State Agency Employees: responses, which also increased slightly: 8.00                                 1.48              5 7.00                          1.00            3 Min Value Max Value Average Standard Responses Value Deviation Min Value 5.00 Max Value Average Value 6.00 Standard Deviation Responses 4.00 5.80 9 Average Value 5.22 Min Value Max Value Average Value Average Value Standard Responses 5.27 Min Value Max Value Responses Deviation 4.00 5.58 2nd Survey Responses for Non-State Agency Employees: 3rd Survey Responses for Non-State Agency Employees:  The survey respondents were asked to describe their rationale for their ratings. Several respondents indicated that, while SIBs are technically doable, they will only be feasible in Maryland if the leadership (at the Executive and Legislative branches) is supportive, if there As part of the final survey, respondents were provided with a list of populations/intervention areas for a potential SIB and were asked to select the topic areas that they thought have the greatest potential to work as a SIB in Maryland. The two topic areas selected most often were juvenile justice recidivism reduction (11 out of 12 respondents) and early childhood education/pre-K (8 out of 12 respondents). 4 2 3 8 4 1 11 4 3 3 1 3 are champions for the work within State government, and if funding is available to support all of the components of the SIB—including the future repayment and success payments. There was general agreement that, if the right project is selected for a SIB, it could be of great benefit to Maryland; however, there are still many details that would need to be addressed. Answer Response Asthma Diabetes Early Childhood Mental Health Early Childhood Education/Pre-K Home Visiting Pediatric & Primary Care Integration Juvenile Justice Recidivism Reduction Prisoner Re-Entry/Recidivism Reduction (adult offender) Child Welfare Housing First/Homelessness-Chronic Homeless Population Housing First/Homelessness-Families Housing First/Homelessness-Youth Aging Out of Child Welfare/Juvenile Justice Elder Care 1 Hunger 1 Other: Maryland Safety Compact      1 In its final meeting, the Workgroup discussed the multiple arenas in which SIBs are being discussed in Maryland, including by the Mayor of Baltimore City’s Pay for Success Workgroup. The City of Baltimore applied to receive technical assistance from the Harvard Social Impact Bond Lab, and the Maryland Early Childhood Investment Council, a subgroup of the Early Childhood Advisory Council, is interested in SIBs and other alternative financing mechanisms. The Workgroup is hopeful that these entities and others will use the information gained through this process to assist them with decision-making regarding the pursuit of SIBs or other pay for success financing. 10 The workgroup emphasized two particular elements as critical for consideration by anyone interested in pursuing a SIB in Maryland: Conclusion 1) The evaluation is a critical component; the contract must have clear, measurable indicators and outcome measures to attract investors; and, 2) SIBs require a negotiation process, and the government is not necessarily the driver of the negotiation process. 11 Based on the discussions at the Workgroup meetings and the results of the surveys, the Workgroup has indicated that SIBs could potentially be implemented in Maryland, if there is sufficient leadership from the Executive Branch and the General Assembly, as well as a clearly defined population and target outcome. The Workgroup ultimately determined that SIBs have tremendous potential but the viability is dependent on the population and intervention. It is the collective hope of the Workgroup that Maryland continues to investigate and pursue creative financing options for human services, whether through SIBs or other financing mechanisms. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2012). Pay for Performance (P4P): AHRQ Resources . Available online from the AHRQ website: http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pay4per.htm Works Cited Alden, W. (2013, June 12). Goldman Sachs to finance early education program. The New York Times Deal B%k. Retrieved from http://payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/goldman_sachs_to_finance...n_program_- _nytimes.com_.pdf Blighty Britain. (2013, May 10). Prisoner rehabilitation: The Peterborough principles [blog post]. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2013/05/prisoner- rehabilitation#comments Costa, K. & Kohli, J. (2012). Social impact bonds: New York City and Massachusetts to launch the first social impact bond programs in the United States. Retrieved from http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/11/05/43834/new- york-city-and-massachusetts-to-launch-the-first-social-impact-bond-programs-in-the- united-states/ Costa, K., Shah, S., Ungar, S. & The Social Impact Bonds Working Group. (2012). Frequently asked questions: Social Impact Bonds. Available online from The Center for American Progress website: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/12/05/46934/ frequently-asked-questions-social-impact-bonds/#n0 Dugger, R. (2013). Early Child Human Capital Investment: “Pay for Success” Finance. Presentation to the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, Baltimore, MD. Eager, E. (2013, July 16). Public-private partnership pumps dollars into preschool program. Deseret News. Retrieved from http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865583232/Public- private-partnership-pumps-dollars-into-preschool-program.html Fiennes, C. (2013, April 3). What the first social impact bond won’t tell us: Two views on evaluating the pilot SIB in Peterborough, UK [blog post]. Retrieved from http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/what_the_first_social_impact_bond_wont_tell_u s Gilroy, L. (2013). The emergence of Social Impact Bonds: Paying for success in social service innovation. Annual Privatization Report 2013. Retrieved from http://reason.org/news/show/apr-2013-social-impact-bonds Godeke, S. & Resner, L. (2013). Building a healthy and sustainable social impact bond market: The investor landscape. Retrieved from http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/building- healthy-sustainable-social Goldberg, S. (2013a). Dear Public Sector. Social Impact Bond Tribune (No.3). Goldberg, S. (2013b). Legislative Primer. Social Impact Bond Tribune (No.4). Goldberg, S. (2013c). The Evaluator’s New Clothes. Social Impact Bond Tribune (No. 4). 12 Joseph, K. (2013). Social Impact Bonds [infographic]. Retrieved from http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/a39e8cdf-494f-486e-a8c2- 1170c7ffc5c6-rockefeller.pdf Leventhal, R. (2013). Maryland Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Working Group Meeting #2. A presentation to the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, Baltimore, MD. Misner, K. (2013). Bringing social impact bonds to New York City. A presentation to the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, Baltimore, MD. Oss, M. E. (2013, January). Understanding The “Risk” In An “At-Risk” Contract. OPEN MINDS Management Newsletter. Salamon, L. (2013). Towards a new era of social purpose finance. A presentation to the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, Baltimore, MD. Schoenberg, J. (2013). Maryland Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Working Group Meeting #3. A presentation to the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, Baltimore, MD. Social Finance U.S. (2013). Promising applications for social impact bonds. Retrieved from http://www.socialfinanceus.org/social-impact-financing/social-impact-bonds/areas-focus Social Finance U.S. (2013, March 25). The California Endowment awards grant to Social Finance and Collective Health: Asthma management demonstration project in Fresno, CA paves way for social impact bond. Retrieved from http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/imce/user/u104/Fre sno%20Asthma%20Demonstration%20Project%20Press%20Release.pdf Spears, J. (2013). Social impact bonds: Introduction. A presentation to the Social Impact Bond Workgroup, Baltimore, MD. 13 14 APPENDICES Appendix A: Table of SIBs, Pre-SIBs, and SIB-Like Activity AppendixB: July17,2013MeetingMaterials AppendixC: September10,2013MeetingMaterials Appendix D: October 7, 2013 Meeting Materials 15 Appendix A: Table of Operational SIBs, Pre-SIB Activity, and SIB-Like Activity Location Population Investor(s) Intermediary(ies) Evaluators Notes on Initiation & Development OPERATIONAL SIBS Entry by Social Finance UK Ministry of Justice and the Big Lottery Fund will pay Social Finance UK who will pay the investors back at Offenders Institute of Justice as a guarantee for $7.2 million of the $9.6 million investment. Break-even point for the SIB is achieving PRE-SIB ACTIVITY transitioning out of juvenile justice & probation by Third Sector Capital Partners Partners (service providers are procured directly, although ROCA was selected in partnership (information not found) support outcome payments. Separate procurements processes for the intermediaries and the service providers. In September 2013, MA received a federal grant that will expand the capacity of the SIB by an additional 400 youth. homeless (information found) (information not SIB-LIKE ACTIVITY children with asthma California Endowment intermediary) and Collective Health (information not found) create a SIB to serve a larger population. preschool children & J.B. Pritzker Utah’s Children & Granite School District University district to identify alternative financing based on outcomes over a period of several years. Salt Lake County voted to invest an additional $350,000, enabling the project to serve an additional 150 children. The SIB has a 12-year term, with quarterly Peterborough, UK        Prisoner Re-  Private, raised New York City     Juvenile  Goldman Sachs Massachusetts         Youth  Private, raised Social Finance UK    RAND Europe MDRC   The Vera Third Sector Capital    Unknown Launched in 2010; data unavailable until 2014. UK a pre-determined rate over 8 years. Bloomberg Philanthropies provided a grant to serve a 10% reduction in re-incarceration. MA has legislatively-established trust fund to Grant funded to test idea; if successful, plan is to Kellogg Foundation partnered with the school payments. services Chronically   Unknown with Third Sector) Unknown (information not   Unknown individuals not found) Fresno, CA        Low income  Grant from The found) Social Finance (fiscal    Unknown Salt Lake City, UT      Low-income   Goldman Sachs (operational intermediary) United Way, Voices for    Utah State 16 APPENDIX B: July 17, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting • July 17, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting Agenda • July 17, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting Notes • Resources on Social Impact Bonds (SIBs): Reading Materials • Legislative Request and Department of Legislative Services Report • Presentation by Dr. John Spears - Social Impact Bonds: Introduction • Presentation by Dr. Lester Salamon - Towards a New Era of Social Purpose Finance • Presentation by Dr. Robert Dugger - Early Child Human Capital Investment: “Pay for Success” Finance 17 Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Wednesday, July 17, 2013 9:00 am to 12:00 pm The Innovations Institute at the University of Maryland School of Social Work Training Room 306 W. Redwood Street, Baltimore Meeting goal: to provide an overview of Social Impact Bonds (SIB), and examples of SIB projects. 9:00 am to 9:30 am 9:30: am to 9:40 am 9:40 am to 10:40 am 10:40 am to 11:40 am 11:40 am to 12:00 pm Agenda John V. Spears, PhD., has managed Towson University’s budget forecasting and technical assistance contract with the Department of Human Resources and now the Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE) for the past 16 years. An earlier career in banking and experience with MSDE’s Research Forum of last November provided additional interest in Social Impact finance. Dr. Spears will present the basics of Social Impact Bonds, and make the case for serious consideration of this new idea in the context of the summer study. Kyle McKay, Department of Legislative Services’ (DLS) analyst, will present the DLS Report on SIBs –via conference call. Dr. Salamon, Founding Director of the John Hopkins University’s Center for Civil Society Studies, will present a broad overview of the "new frontiers of philanthropy" including Social Impact Bonds. For over 20 years, Dr. Salamon has been exploring the important role that private, nonprofit organizations have come to play in the operation of public programs and the solution of public problems both in the U.S. and in the world. Robert Dugger, Chairman of the Board of Advisors at ReadyNation in Washington DC, will present "Early Childhood Social Impact Finance" and he will discuss the two most recent ReadyNation working papers which focus on contract specification and financial instrument choice - two critical operating features of early childhood pay for success projects. Workgroup: Questions and Answers/Discussion 18 Meeting Notes: Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Wednesday, July 17, 2013 9:00 am to 12:00 pm The Innovations Institute at the University of Maryland School of Social Work Training Room 306 W. Redwood Street, Baltimore Meeting goal: to provide an overview of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs also known as “Pay for Success bonds”), and examples of SIB projects. Members in Attendance: Michelle Zabel, The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, Chair Nathan W. Bowen, Department of Budget & Management Nancy Fitzgerald (for Marcella Franczkowski), Maryland State Department of Education Jeanne-Marie Holly, Maryland State Department of Education Farid Keshavarz, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services Delegate Samuel Rosenberg, Maryland General Assembly Dan Feller, Governor’s Office for Children Angela Lagdemeo, Director of Policy and Planning, Department of Human Resources Netsanet Kibret, Deputy Director of Government, Corporate and Community Affairs, Department of Human Resources Miriam Shark, Annie E. Casey Foundation Margaret Williams, Maryland Family Network Beth Harber for Terry Staudenmaier, Abell Foundation Rolf Grafwallner, Maryland State Department of Education Observers: Ari Blum, George Failla, Louise Corwin, Renee Spence Staff: John Spears, Roann Tsakalas, Tranae Hardy Welcome by Chair, Michelle Zabel. Michelle briefly reviewed the statement of work and goals for the Summer Study on SIBs. Then workgroup members and observers introduced themselves. The first presenter was Dr. John Spears, Senior Human Services Consultant at Towson University’s Regional Economic Studies Institute and data analyst for the Maryland State Department of Education. Dr. Spears set the stage for an understanding of SIBs using his PowerPoint presentation entitled “Social Impact Bonds: Introduction.” On Slides 2-5, Dr. Spears laid out the basic rationale for SIB’s, including the important point that there are a number of human capital building programs, including early childhood health and education, prison recidivism and homelessness, that have very solid evidence of success and promise market- 19 viable returns. Slide 5 underlines the large size of the potential market for SIBs totaling $80 trillion counting worldwide debt securities in 2011, of which even a tiny slice could revolutionize the potential for human capital investment in the US. Slide 6 provides definitions of SIBs, noting that they are very new, and that even basic descriptive terms in the literature can vary. Slide 7, presented in five steps, built a schematic of the ideal SIB, with working definitions of each of the major component organizations (players) in the structure grouped on Slides 8 and 9. The role of intermediary was emphasized as central in organizing and supporting the undertaking. The success of the SIB relies on the success of the service providers, of course, but the essence of the SIB is the savings realized by government and refund of those savings to investors, based on the findings of the researchers that the service were successfully delivered and made a real difference in the subject population. If the program were unsuccessful, private investors could lose all or a portion of their investment. Slide 10 showed a map of geographical distribution of SIB interest in the US as of early 2013. A number of states, including Maryland, have at least begun investigations of the idea (shown in gray). Light green shows more SIB activity. The next darker green is Utah and Massachusetts which are already involved in SIBs but have not yet completed implementation. Massachusetts is having trouble getting its SIB off the ground. New York is darkest green because New York City has the nation’s only operational SIB as of July of 2013. If New York can reduce recidivism among juveniles incarcerated on Rikers Island by 10% in 2 years (considering several cohorts of inmates), Goldman Sachs stands to make a maximum of $2.2 million return on their $9.6 million investment. There might also be savings left for government if the program is extremely successful. Question – how will Goldman get their return? Response – Goldman will receive money from unspent government funds that did not have to be spent on jail services. Kyle McKay, Department of Legislative Services’ (DLS) analyst, presented the Department of Legislative Services Report Kyle by phone. Mr. McKay briefly reviewed the report listing his objections to the viability of the SIB concept. These included an apparent lack of sufficient savings to reward investors based on analysis of Maryland Dept of Corrections marginal cost data, a lack of existing mechanisms in Maryland to match one-year budget cycle planning to the long-term commitments needed to pay off SIB investors, and an assertion that, if the SIB programs were really so solidly successful, they should be financed with general revenue bonds. Dr. Lester Salamon, Founding Director of the John Hopkins University’s Center for Civil Society Studies, presented a PowerPoint entitled, “Towards a New Era of Social Purpose Finance.” Dr. Salamon stated that SIBs are one method to fund human services, but that the traditional paradigm of philanthropy has changed. While the beneficiaries remain the same, 20 there are new sources of funding, new actors, new tools, and new agents. Examples of new actors include capital aggregators, secondary markets, social stock exchanges, and foundations acting as philanthropic banks. These new methods are attracting the top foundations. There are about 415 new conversion foundations that fund the privatization of services (top slide of page 2). Leverage runs behind these new funding projects. These new frontiers of philanthropy, such as social ventures and investment capital, demonstrate a way to take a limited supply of social funding and leverage it to provide more human services. There has been a great proliferation in types of funders and the sheer number of funders over the last few decades. There is investment capital willing to pay for operating expenses for human services programs. Grants are inefficient because once the money is spent it is gone and not able to be reinvested. These capital tranches have risk and return requirements. The low income housing model means that you need tax credits and other incentives to get funding from the bank and contracts with builders. Governments need to utilize resources to come up with guarantees for investors. For example Gates is putting money into charter schools that involve education management organizations. Social ventures are exploring a mix of investments in for profits and non profits. Governments may have to create legal structures for these investment strategies to work. SIBS rely on a social and financial return. The new focus in human service investment is on metrics and outcomes. People are still the beneficiaries as before in the traditional funding model of grants. Page 3, bottom slide lists the new actors, and includes the new intermediaries. New tools equal new financing which was not used before in human services but used in business. The new agents are the new service providers. We are still in the early stages for new sources of funds. Capital aggregators are community development finance institutions, such as the Bank of America’s Capital Access fund for housing development (page 4, top slide). Globally there is $300 billion being used by capital aggregators for operating funds. Page 4 slide 2 gives examples of social purpose secondary markets, such as Habitat for Humanity and Self Help North Carolina. The UK has established the Social Stock Exchange UK where investors can buy and sell stock when they want. New foundations are functioning as philanthropic banks. They utilize balloons and equity investment, and now are dipping into their endowments and principle funds. Foundations are key actors because they bring investors. The ILO Microinsurance Innovation Facility is convincing insurance companies to provide low cost per unit insurance for pooled small companies. All-Life insures HIV/AIDS victims in South Africa which has resulted in improved client health. The UN World Food Program pays Ethiopian farmers for work on irrigation projects to protect against floods, and the insurance pays if the irrigation project fails and there is a flood. SIBs get ahead of the curve for trying something new. Government is willing to pay for things that may not work, whereas investors want proven strategies to increase the likelihood that they will have a return on their investment. No SIBs have been proven yet. The challenge is in capturing savings to fund the returns to investors. The demand factors for human services have been present but what is new is the new supply of financing. A new set of actors have emerged globally. Social entrepreneurs are putting their talents to serve the world’s problems. For example, the production process for one pair of eyeglasses in India is now $3. Creating competition and new financing brought down the price so many more children can attend school because they can see. Another example is the access to sanitary napkins and how to make sanitary napkins that are cheap and reusable for Third World women. The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, by C. K. Prahalad, argues that the bottom of the pyramid is penalized as these people pay more because there is no competition to provide them products. Competition will bring them cheaper products. These examples are business models that have a return and do something good for society. Dot-com investor, Charly Kleissner has invested $10b in Indian glass makers through impact funding (see KL Felicitas Foundation at http://www.klfelicitasfoundation.org/ . Dr. Salamon referred to the book called Philanthro-Capitalist, by Matthew Bishop and Michael F. Green, which examines the work of “social investors” and how they are using business strategies to fund human services in exchange for results and accountability. He discussed an example of this perspective was evident at an Social Impact conference in Baltimore last year where business school students attended that want to make a financial and social impact. The next step is for government to visualize what can be done in terms of utilizing these new human service financing methods. Dr. Salamon’s new book New Frontiers of Philanthropy may be translated into training materials. Last slide on page 9 lists implications of new financing strategies for states. Dr. Salamon stated that we need to do this locally in Baltimore and the State. The new financing strategies require new skills in order to bundle the factors together around concrete projects with potential. Government needs to establish what problem it wants to solve, and talk to investors and they will be able to come up with financing strategies. Investors will help write a business plan and assist in going after the money. Enterprise brokers, like the Kellogg Foundation want to get into this arena, so they hired Blueprint Partners and they did a scan of what is impacting the food problem in the country. They presented what a few organizations are doing to help, and the Kellogg Foundation started to work with them. KIPP, an educational management organization, went to Gates Foundation for facilities money and Gates hired consultants to create a bond guarantee. Charter schools may fail 30% of the time which is a low failure rate and so bonds were sold successfully on Wall Street. State government and local government need to sit down with the investment world to see what programs would work with these new financing models. Governments can incentivize investors with tax incentives and other tools to bring actors to the table and not use savings to fund investment. Maryland needs to look at laws, procurement and the budget process and how they could support this type of investment. Does Maryland have the ability to offer bond incentives that could be used for small programs, such as Friends of the Family? 21 Dr. Robert Dugger, Chairman of the Board of Advisors at ReadyNation in Washington DC, presented "Early Child Human Capital Investment: ‘Pay for Success’ Finance" PowerPoint, and he discussed the two most recent ReadyNation working papers which focus on contract specification and financial instrument choice. Dr. Dugger’s experience is in government and banking. He worked in hedge funds for 20 years as partner, and then retired. His personal interest is in conservation in Tanzania. In order to conserve the wildebeest, which migrate outside the Tanzania National Park, Dr. Dugger formed the Vermitti Company which purchased an additional 350 acres to extend the national park. He worked with Maasai tribal groups to preserve this area which is the size of Delaware. This extension ended poaching which was out of control and threatening the wildebeest herds. The investors were able to realize a return on their investment because a few very exclusive hotels were built on the 350 acres to support the preservation effort and pay back the investors. The ReadyNation organization was born from support from the Pew Charitable Trust. ReadyNation’s focus is on building business leaders’ interest in investing in children in their area in order to create the greatest growth in human capital. ReadyNation’s study found that 100 million people are involved in raising children – baby food, doctors, parents, teachers, etc. The child powered industry is 30% larger than other business sector. Therefore, investing in children ages 0 to 5 will yield a high return. Dr. Dugger believes that the highest return is in investing specifically in the zero to 3 child population. Research indicates that pre-birth care postiviely shapes a child’s life outcomes. In order for governments to attract investors they must “monetize the game.” The work must be organized by contracts and reflect a business model – see paper on http://www.readynation.org/sib. The role of ReadyNation is to convince businesses to invest in children. The key attraction to business is that an early investment in children will mean that they will cost less as they get older in terms of school and public health needs, and eventually, training needs at the time of employment. On slide 3, Dr. Dugger points out that the Pritzker Foundation backed ReadyNation and Jeff Liebman’s Social Impact Bond Lab at Harvard University. Pritzker and other foundations are working to get governments interested in SIBs. Slide 7 explains Pay for Success. Dr. Dugger explains that the object of investment is whatever outcomes we deem to be important. Slide 8 explains all the actors at the table and their roles. Slide 9 demonstrates how a SIB works. Third party evaluators cost money but their role certifies the project and is vital to investor buy in. Government must prove through independent statistical accountability that the project is working to satisfy the investor. Slide 9 demonstrates how the SIB drives success. Eighty percent is ideally paid to the intermediary. Government needs a cushion of 20% which it reserves from the savings. There are contracts between the intermediary and the service provider, the intermediary and government, and a contract among all involved parties. Massachusetts created a special fund to 22 23 prefund their SIB; this was done through a state statute to encourage agencies to enter into contracts and this money can be put aside in a “sinking fund.” Right now the Bank of America in Maryland wants to get into social financing, for Community Reinvestment Act purposes. Maryland must create standardized contracts, standardized research methods, statutes, etc. if they want to begin a SIB financing strategy. Slide 11 puts together all the necessary steps in a SIB. Salt Lake County Council voted to set aside $350K for success payments for the new PreK SIB program. These first early education SIB projects have taken 4 years to get to this point. Slide 13 lays out timeline of what needs to be accomplished to implement a SIB and how long each step takes. Slide 14 explains points of potential savings for a few children’s programs. Slide 15 lists who invests in SIBs. Slide 17 demonstrates a PreK SIB 10 year payout. Another example - neo natal intensive care lasts on average 90 days and avoiding one hospital stay can realize a savings of $200k which can be paid back over time. Slide 18 shows examples of PreK savings realized through special education service avoidance. Slide 21 shows data from Lehigh Valley County School System, PA and the potential savings from Pay for Success. Slide 22 outlines the Pay for Success model for Salt Lake City, UT. The SIB contracts go to the Utah legislature in spring 2014 for approval. The Chair, Ms. Zabel, thanked everyone for coming and thanked the speakers for their participation. She also reminded the group that the next meeting will be on September 10 from 9 am to noon at the Innovations Institute. Approved at September 10, 2013 meeting. Highly Recommended: Resources on Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) Community Development Investment Review. “Social Impact Bonds: Lessons Learned So Far.” http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/review/vol9_issue1/social-impact- bonds-lessons-learned.pdf, and other SIB articles. Steven Godeke and Lyel Resner. “Building a Healthy & Sustainable Social Impact Bond Market: The Investor Landscape,” for the Rockefeller Foundation, December 2012. http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/publications/building-healthy-sustainable-social This publication surveys likely SIB investors, informing on a crucial element of SIB feasibility. ReadyNation. Several papers on Social Impact Bonds. http://www.readynation.org/sib Social Finance. “Peterborough Social Impact Bond.” 2011. http://socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/SF_Peterborough_SIB_0.pdf Recommended: Lisa Barclay and Tom Symons, “A Technical Guide to Social Impact Bonds,” Social Finance, January 2013. http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/sf_svc_guide.pdf Businesswire.Com. “Pritzker, Goldman Sachs Announce $20 Million First Phase of Early Childhood Innovation Accelerator Initiative.” June 13, 2013. http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130613005888/en/Pritzker-Goldman-Sachs- Announce-20-Million-Phase The Center for American Progress. http://www.americanprogress.org/search/?query=new+financing+tool – link to several reports on SIBs. Kristina Costa, et al. “Frequently Asked Questions: Social Impact Bonds”, Center for American Progress. December 2012. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/12/05/46934/frequently- asked-questions-social-impact-bonds/ Emma Disley, et al. “Lessons learned from the planning and early implementation of the Social Impact Bond at HMP Peterborough.” HM Ministry of Justice, May, 2011. www.justice.gov.uk/publications/research.htm The Economist. “Performance bonds: Who succeeds gets paid” from The Economist, Feb 17, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18180436?story_id=18180436 Jeffrey Liebman, “Social Impact Bonds: A Promising New Financing Model to Accelerate Social Innovation and Improve Government Performance,” Center for American Progress, February 2011. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/social_impact_bonds.html 24 The Economist. “The Peterborough principles.” May 10, 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2013/05/prisoner-rehabilitation The Economist. "Social-Impact Bonds: Commerce and Conscience." Feb 23rd 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21572231-new-way-financing- public-services-gains-momentum-commerce-and-conscience. Emily Bolton and Louise Savelle. “Towards a New Social Economy: Blended Value Creation through Social Impact Bonds.” Social Finance UK, March 2010, http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/Towards_A_New_Social_Economy_web. pdf . Steve Goldberg. “The Social Impact Bond Tribune.” January 31, 2013. http://payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/sib_trib_no._2.pdf Steven Greenhut. “California’s Scary New Way to Raise Public Money.” Apr 28, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-28/california-pushes-social-impact-bond- gimmicks.html Jonathan Greenblatt. “Social Impact Bonds Bring Social Innovation to the Bay State.” March 28, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-greenblatt/shot-heard-round-the- worl_b_858961.html Goldman Sachs. “As city budgets decline, an innovative effort suggests a new way to leverage private capital.” http://www.goldmansachs.com/s/2012annual/client- stories/innovation/?cid=PS_01_43_06_00_00_00_01 Harvard Kennedy School, Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab, http://hks- siblab.org/ Kyle McKay, the author of Md’s DLS report, in the Stanford Social Institute blog: http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/debunking_the_myths_behind_social_impact_bond_spe culation J. P. Morgan. “Impact Investments: An emerging asset class.” Nov 29, 2010. http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/2b053b2b-8feb-46ea-adbd- f89068d59785-impact.pdf Kauffman Foundation – ReadyNation. “Early Childhood ‘Pay-For-Success’ Social Impact Finance: A PKSE Bond Example to Increase School Readiness and Reduce Special Education Costs.” March 2012, http://humcap.uchicago.edu/RePEc/hka/wpaper/Dugger_Litan_2012_early-childhood- pay.pdf Also, “Progress Report: Social Impact Finance.” http://www.readynation.org/uploads/db_files/KauffmanReadyNationPKSEPresentation.pdf Kauffman Foundation – ReadyNation.: A PKSE Bond Example to Increase School Readiness and Reduce Special Education Costs.” http://www.readynation.org/pkse-webinar-april-3 25 Kristina Costa and Jitinder Kohli. "Social Impact Bonds: New York City And Massachusetts To Launch The First Social Impact Bond Programs In The United States." November 5, 2012. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/11/05/43834/new-york- city-and-massachusetts-to-launch-the-first-social-impact-bond-programs-in-the-united- states/. McKinsey & Company. “From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the U.S.” May 2012. http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/McKinsey_Social_Impact_Bo nds_Report.pdf MDRC. “Social Impact Bond Project at Rikers Island.” www.mdrc.org//project/social- impact-bond-project-rikers- island?gclid=CNSqh9jwhrcCFalQOgod1kcAGg#featured_content Nonprofit Finance Fund, “Pay for Success/Social Impact Bond Initiative,” and their Rapid Suitability Questionnaires at http://nonprofitfinancefund.org/pay-for-success The Rockefeller Foundation. “Solutions for Impact Investors: From Strategy to Implementation.” February 2010. http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/publications/solutions-impact-investors-from Social Finance, Inc. “Social Impact Bonds: An Overview.” 2012. http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/655fab01-83b9-49eb-b856- a1f61bc9e6ca-small.pdf Social Science. “The California Endowment Awards Grant to Social Finance and Collective Health.” March 25, 2013. http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/imce/user/u104/Fresno%20Ast hma%20Demonstration%20Project%20Press%20Release.pdf Social Finance. “A New Tool For Scaling Impact: How Social Impact Bonds Can Mobilize Private Capital to Advance Social Good.” February 2012. http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/resources/social-finance/new-tool-scaling-impact-how- social-impact-bonds-can-mobilize-private-capita Third Sector Capital Partners. “Preparing for a Pay for Success Opportunity.” 2013. http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Third-Sector_Roca_Preparing- for-Pay-for-Success-in-MA.pdf . This paper shows what ROCA, the service provider chosen to run Massachusetts’ juvenile justice intervention, went through to prepare for application to the state to be a part of the State’s social impact bond initiative. 26 27  28  29  30  31 32 33  34  35  36  37  38  39 40 41  42  43  44  45 46 47 48  49  50  51  Social Impact Bonds Introduction July 17, 2013 52 Why don’t we fund more large, public cost-saving initiatives? There are a number of programs that promise very large improvements in social outcomes and potentially large cost savings to State government with solid research studies backing up the promise examples: early childhood interventions for health or education prison recidivism reduction homelessness prevention Human capital improvement 53 RESI of Towson University  Why don’t we fund more large, public cost-saving initiatives? (2) BUT o They are programs with long-term benefits coupled with large up-front costs . . . o And it is difficult to interest the public in investing in even excellent programs with such a long pay-back period. 54 RESI of Towson University  A Solution: o Suppose you could fund such programs by creating a o financial instrument (loan) that could o tap global debt markets by o rewarding private investors in the long-term o for putting up substantial funds now? o That is the idea behind Social Impact Bonds aka “Pay for Success” Bonds. 55 RESI of Towson University  A Solution (2): o Why go to the trouble? Revolutionary potential for social improvement A potential market of $80 trillion (a very large number!) 56 RESI of Towson University  What are Social Impact Bonds? A new idea for financing social programs. o A Social Impact Bond (SIB) is a contract with the private sector in which a commitment is made to pay for improved social outcomes that result in public sector savings.1 o SIB‟s provide funds for “initiatives that have the potential to mitigate serious social problems and reduce government costs for later remedial services.”2 o It is not technically a bond, but a “multi-stakeholder partnership” without guaranteed interest rate or repayment schedule. 57 RESI of Towson University  Ideal Social Impact Bond design 3 $ 1 5 2 $ 4 6 58 RESI of Towson University  1. 2. 3. Social Impact Bond Participants The government sets a specific outcome it wants to achieve relative to a well defined population over a given time period. The government contracts with an intermediary to achieve the pre-set outcome. Investors provide up-front capital to pay for the program in question. Investors are repaid their capital plus a return only if the target outcome is met. The intermediary engages service providers to deliver evidence-based programs. 4.  59 RESI of Towson University  Ideal Social Impact Bond design(2) 3 $ $ 1 $ 7 2 $ 4 $ Savings 5 6 60 RESI of Towson University  Social Impact Bond Participants(2) 5. An independent evaluation advisor monitors the progress of the interventions. 6. An independent researcher determines if predetermined performance targets have been met. 7. If the target is met, the government repays investor principal plus interest. Note: there are many variations on this structure, as different governmental entities wrestle with how best to structure the deal. 61 RESI of Towson University  Promising Interventions  Projects that aim to reduce recidivism among those released from prison- NYC example, also Peterborough  Homelessnesspreventionservices-Massachusettsis working on it  Prenatal, early childhood and pre-school services- Utah and South Carolina examples  Preventive healthcare interventions, such as those for asthma or diabetes- Fresno example  Home based services designed to keep the elderly out of nursing homes  Employment/workforcedevelopmentservices 62 RESI of Towson University  Resources 1. Steven Godeke and Lyel Resner,“Building a Healthy and Sustainable Social Impact Bond Market: The Investor Landscape,” Godeke Consulting and The Rockefeller Foundation, November 2012, available at www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/publications/building-healthy-sustainable-social 2. Center for American Progress, “ Frequently Asked Questions: Social Impact Bonds,” Dec 5, 2012, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/12/05/46934/frequently-asked-questions- social-impact-bonds/ 3. Nonprofit Finance Fund,“Pay for success/Social Impact Bond Initiative,” http://nonprofitfinancefund.org/pay- for-success 4. Social Finance (UK) http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/resources/social-finance/technical-guide-developing- social-impact-bonds 5. Dugger and Litan,“Early Childhood„Pay-For-Success‟ Social Impact Finance: A PKSE Bond Example to Increase School Readiness and Reduce Special Education Costs,” A Report of the Kauffman Foundation – ReadyNation Working Group on Early Childhood Finance Innovation, p. 3 at http://ideas.repec.org/p/hka/wpaper/2012-007.html 6. The Economist,“Performance bonds Who succeeds gets paid” from The Economist, Feb 17, 2011 http://www.economist.com/node/18180436?story_id=18180436 See also Jonathan Greenblatt and Annie Donovan,“The Promise of Pay for Success” in Community Development Investment Review, April 2013 at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/review/vol9_issue1/review-volume-9-issue-1.pdf 7. The New York Times, “Getting Back More Than a Warm Feeling” Nov 8, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/giving/investors-profit-by-giving-through-social-impact- bonds.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 ; also, Mayor Bloomberg‟s press release, Aug 2012 at http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/urban-investments/case-studies/social- impact-bond-pdf.pdf ; also, Hannah Azemati, et al., “Pay for Success Financing” in the SF Fed‟s Community Development Investment Review, April 2013, p. 25 at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/review/vol9_issue1/review-volume-9-issue-1.pdf 63 RESI of Towson University  John V. Spears RESI of Towson University July 17, 2013 64 Finis 65 RESI of Towson University  TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF SOCIAL PURPOSE FINANCE 66 Dr. Lester M. Salamon Johns Hopkins University July 17, 2013 WHAT’S HAPPENING? PHILANTHROPY’S BIG BANG  Beyond grants  Beyond bequests  Beyond foundations  Beyond cash LEVERAGE SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 67 Aquinas Growth Fund Accion PHILANTHROPY’S BIG BANG Bovespa Venture philanthropy SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 68 Pooled Income Funds NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY PARADIGM PHILANTHROPY = The mobilization of private resources for social and environmental purposes TRADITIONAL PHILANTHROPY NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY Foundations, Individuals Operating income Grants Nonprofits Social return Limited leverage Output Focus Individual and institutional investors Investment capital Diverse financial instruments/capital tranches Social ventures Social + financial return Expanded leverage Outcome focus/ metrics SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 69  NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY ECOSYSTEM NEW SOURCES OF FUNDS NEW ACTORS NEW TOOLS NEW AGENTS BENEFICIARIES SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 70 TYPES OF ACTORS Capital Aggregators Secondary Markets Social Stock Exchanges Foundations as Philanthropic Banks Quasi-Public Investment Funds Enterprise Brokers Online Portals Corp-Originated Charitable Funds Funding Foundations Collaboratives TYPES OF TOOLS Loans / Credit Enhancements Bonds Insurance Securitization Equity Investments Social Impact Bonds Social Investing & Purchasing Prizes, Crowd-sourcing Capacity Builders Conversion ACTORS/TOOLS SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 71 CAPITAL AGGREGATORS EXAMPLES: • Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) • BAML Capital Access Funds • ACCION International • Economic Innovation International (EII) METRICS: • Globally, Capital Aggregators – $300 billion US (215 billion euro) • 1,300 CDFIs / $19.7 billion of investments • BAML – $300 million of pension fund capital invested in 25 funds EII – $20 Billion Triple Bottom Line equity funds SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 72 • Habitat for Humanity • Self-Help North Carolina • BRAC METRICS: • CRF – $1 billion in loans purchased SECONDARY MARKETS EXAMPLES: • Community Reinvestment Fund (CRF) • Habitat Flex Cap Program – leverages $1 billion • Self-Help North Carolina – $4.5 billion in mortgage investments • BRAC securitizing $180 million microfinance loans SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 73 EXAMPLES: • Social Stock Exchange UK SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGES • Impact Investment Exchange (IIX) Asia • Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) • Bovespa (Brazil) METRICS: • IIX has established an arrangement with the Singapore Stock Exchange to list the bonds and stocks of social enterprises • Eur Climate Exchange ECX – 5.3 billion tons CO2 Equivs in 2010/ US$85-90 billion ; Global carbon credit market= US 142 billion SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 74 METRICS: • Fondazione CRT: FOUNDATIONS AS PHILANTHROPIC BANKS EXAMPLES: • Fondazione CRT in Italy • F.B. Heron Foundation • Annie E. Casey Foundation • K.L. Felicitas Foundation 42% of grant-making towards mission/impact investing • F.B. Heron Foundation: 43% of assets in mission/impact investing • Multiple tools beyond grants SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 75 TYPES OF ACTORS Capital Aggregators Secondary Markets Social Stock Exchanges Foundations as Philanthropic Banks Quasi-Public Investment Funds Enterprise Brokers Online Portals Corp-Originated Charitable Funds Funding Foundations Collaboratives TYPES OF TOOLS Loans / Credit Enhancements Bonds Insurance Securitization Equity Investments Social Impact Bonds Social Investing & Purchasing Prizes, Crowd-sourcing Capacity Builders Conversion ACTORS/TOOLS SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 76 CONCEPT : METRICS: INSURANCE • Less than 3 percent of low-income people in world’s 100 poorest countries have insurance • Key defining feature: RISK POOLING • ILO Microinsurance Innovation Facility • LeapFrog microinsurance investment fund • Potentialmarketformicro-insurance–1.5to3billionpeople • All-Life: Insures HIV/AIDS victims in South Africa; 200 percent growth in client base in 2010 + 15% improvement in client health. • UN World Food Program pays Ethiopian farmers for work on irrigation projects with drought insurance SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 77 EXAMPLES: • UK Social Impact Bond SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS • Pay for Success — MA, Minnesota, NYC HOW DOES IT WORK? UK Social Impact Bond • UK Gov’t offers to repay private investments in services to reduce recidivism at Peterborough prison—with dividends • Sliding scale of dividends keyed to program success • Metrics and control group to measure success • Monetizes savings from program success—Gov’t pays 10 million GBP for 20 million GBP of program savings SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 78 DEMAND FACTORS: • Persistent poverty WHY NOW? • Population pressures • Global warming/ environmental crises • Failed states/ Governmental retrenchment SUPPLY FACTORS: • Social entrepreneurs/ Prahalad —”BOP penalty” • Dot-com Philanthrocapitalists / Net Impact • Tepid traditional capital markets • Psychological impact of financial crisis SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 79 NEXT STEPS VISUALIZE PUBLICIZE  INCENTIVIZE CAPACITIZE ACTUALIZE SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 80 IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES NEW PARTNERS NEW FINANCIAL MECHANISMS NEW SKILL REQUIREMENTS NEW AUTHORITIES? SOURCE: Lester M Salamon, Ed., The New Frontiers of Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (forthcoming). 81 THE NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY - TABLE OF CONTENTS 82 LESTER M. SALAMON lsalamon@jhu.edu Website: ccss.jhu.edu Twitter: @JHUCCSS 83 Early Child Human Capital Investment: “Pay for Success” Finance Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Innovations Institute, School of Social Work University of Maryland Robert H. Dugger Co-Chair, ReadyNation July 17, 2013 Today I will present the results of two recent publications on early childhood “pay for success” finance The two most recent ReadyNation working papers focus on contract specification and financial instruments choice, two critical operating features of early childhood pay for success (PFS) projects. www.ReadyNation.org/PFS "Early Childhood Pay for Success Social Impact Finance: Organizational Steps, Memorandum of Understanding and Contract Outlines." Report of the ReadyNation Working Group on contracts in Early Childhood Social Impact Finance, ReadyNation Working Paper, June 10, 2013. "Financing Human Capital Development for Economically Disadvantaged Children: Applying Pay for Success Social Impact Finance to Early Child Development." Janis A. Dubno, Robert H. Dugger, and Michelle R. Smith. ReadyNation Working Paper, June 10, 2013 84 First a word about ReadyNation... ReadyNation Social Impact Finance Portfolio of Work  Convene national work group on early childhood SIBs: A “Five Year Vision” for pay-for-success assets  Working papers on early childhood social impact finance structure and contracts  Hub of working documents from state and local initiatives  EC Social Impact Performance Advisors, funded by the Pritzker Foundation: Collaboration and training consultancy for senior investment, legal and public finance experts  Join the EC SIB listserv at www.ReadyNation.org/PFS 85 Education is the key: The US used to be first. Now we’re just average... 86 To produce globally competitive young adults.. ...you must first produce school-ready five year olds. 87 Rate of return on investments in human capital by age... Programs targeted at earliest years Preschool programs 88 Primary, secondary schooling and college Job training 89 “Pay for Success” Social Impact Finance “Pay for Success” refers to performance-based contracting between government and providers of social services arranged by an intermediary or lead contractor. Government pays only when results are achieved. “Success” has two meanings – “Cost avoidance” actual reductions in governments operating costs that are the result of an intervention “Outcome improvement” measured changes in outcomes in desired directions that are the result of an intervention Third Party PFS Project Evaluation and Certification Private, Philanthropic, Government & Provider PFS Organizers Third Party Feasibility Research Step 1: Organizers study Feasibility Research and decide whether to move forward Government Health or Education Agency Early Childhood Pay for Success Investment Intermediary Early Health or Education Service Providers Main Participants in a Pay for Success Project 90 Flow of Funds in a Pay for Success Project (arrows) Private, Philanthropic and Government PFS Investors Third Party PFS Project Evaluation and Certification 5. Intermediary Issuer repays investors 1. Investors acquire PFS assets and provide working capital Third Party Feasibility Study Early Childhood Pay for Success Investment Intermediary Government Health or Education Agency 4. Success Payment for Outcome Improvement or Cost Avoidance 2. Operating funds paid to to Service Providers Early Health or Education Service Providers 3. Cost Avoidance or Outcome Improvement Achieved 91 Pay for Success Statute and Contract Agreements (ovals) State PFS Social Impact Finance Law and Regulations Private, Philanthropic and Government PFS Investors Third Party PFS Project Evaluation and Certification Investors Evaluator Contract with Government, Intermediary & Provider PFS Asset Investor Terms & Conditions Government Health or Education Agency Early Health or Education Service Providers Early Childhood Pay for Success Investment Intermediary Intermediary Government Agency Contract Intermediary and Service Provider Contract 92 Putting it all together -- A Pay for Success Project State PFS Social Impact Finance Third Party PFS Project Evaluation and Certification Private, Philanthropic and Government PFS Investors Law and Regulations Third Party Feasibility Study PFS Asset Investor Terms & Conditions 1. Investors acquire PFS assets and provide working capital Early Childhood Pay for Success Investment Intermediary 5. Intermediary Issuer repays investors Evaluator Contract with Government, Intermediary & Provider Intermediary Government Agency Contract Intermediary and Service Provider Contract Government Health or Education Agency Early Health or Education Service Providers 4. Part of Government savings paid to Intermediary 2. Operating funds paid to to Service Providers 3. Cost Avoidance or Outcome Improvement Achieved 93 94 “Success Payment” “Success Payment” is the portion of the government operating cost reduction paid to the Intermediary for successfully reducing the operating costs of the Government, or a payment for achieving specific outcome improvements Intermediary uses the success payments to pay interest and principle to investors pay bonuses to providers who exceed expected performance levels Establishment and Funding Time Line State Law and Regulation Enactment: Unknown Establishment and Fundraising Phase: 18 Months Contracts with Service Providers, Government Agencies & 3rd Party Certifier Completed Stakeholders agree to organize an Early Childhood Social Impact Enterprise 95 Early Child Social Impact Enterprise Established Social Impact Assets Issued and Funds Received by ECSIE Third Party Feasibility Study Done 2 months 6 months 2 months 6 months 2 months Total: 18 months Intervention Service and Investment Success Time Line Intervention Service Delivery and Initial Success Indication  8 months for prenatal (5 mo average prenatal + 3 mo postpartum)  60 months for pre-k (2 yrs pre-k, 3 yrs k-2nd grade when 90% of special-ed assignments completed) Government Health or Education Agency pays large portion of savings to Intermediary Operating funds paid to to Service Providers Early Health or Education Service Provided Cost savings generated and confirmed by initial evidence 3td Party Evaluator CertifiesSavings to Government Agency, Intermediary & Service Providers Intermediary repays investors 5 months for prenatal health 2 years for pre-k 3 months for prenatal health 3 years for pre-k 1 month 1 month 96 10 to 62 months total 97 Why do investors invest? Private Individuals and Funds – Invest to obtain interest earnings and return of principle Philanthropic Institutions –  Make PRI investments for interest earnings and principle repayment if possible (first-loss tranche)  Make grants to obtain the benefits of long-term all-in outcome improvements that come from interventions such quality prenatal counseling or prekindergarten Local Governments – Invest to obtain more efficient near-term operations and to obtain long-term all-in outcome improvements State and Federal Governments – Invest to obtain long-term all-in outcome improvements and stronger economic and per capita income growth 98 Longer-Term All-In Outcome Improvement Benefits Government and philanthropic investment in PFS pre-k projects should be viewed in the context of the all-in benefits of to the public sector. For pre-k these benefits include everything from lower special-ed costs to higher tax revenues from higher-earning employment. Many studies have looked at the cost/benefit question. Estimated returns on quality pre-k range from 7% to 18% per year. Monetizable and Non-monetizable Benefits  Monetizable benefits are ones that can be accurately measured and captured in workable contracts within investable timeframes from twelve months to ten years. Non-monetizable benefits may be extremely valuable to individuals and society, but they are difficult to measure and capture in workable contracts. Such returns also often take more than ten years to realize.  Near-term special-ed and infant intensive care cost reductions are monetizable, that is, the cost avoidance can be measured accurately and a portion of it can be paid as a “success payment” PFS Fundamental Relationships Cost Ratio - The ratio of intervention cost to remediation cost. The higher the cost of remediation is relative to the cost of intervention, the higher the possible cost avoidance will be, other things equal. For example, the more special-ed costs relative to pre-k, the less pre-k needs to reduce special-ed assignment rates in order to achieve threshold feasibility. Effect Ratio - The ratio of intervention effect to non-intervention effect. The more the intervention achieves the desired outcome, the more cost avoidance is achievable. For example, the more pre-k reduces special-ed assignment rates, the less difference there needs to be between the cost of pre-k and the cost of special-ed. Investor Ratio – The ratio of investor capital to philanthropic and government capital. The more philanthropic and government capital there is in a PFS project , other things equal, the better will be the risk and return profile of the project for investors. 99 100 Two Examples: Prekindergarten Returns and Benchmark Prekindergarten Programs Granite School District Preschool Program Cost Ratio: Pre-k/Special-Ed = 47% Effect Ratio: 30% of 737 at-risk children potentially eligible for Special Education at 4 years old; 1.5% assigned to Special Education through elementary school Bethlehem Area School District Preschool Program Cost Ratio: Pre-k/Special-Ed = 65% Effect Ratio: 18% assignment rate for low income students without pre-k to 2.5% with pre-k Prekindergarten: 500 At-Risk Students in PFS Pre-k and K-12 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 PFS Project Students and Graduates in K-12 PFS Project Year PFS graduates in k-12 grades Children in PFS pre-k Source: "Financing Human Capital Development for Economically Disadvantaged Children: Applying Pay for Success Social Impact Finance to Early Child Development." J A Dubno, R H Dugger, and M R Smith. ReadyNation Working Paper, June 10, 2013 101 Number of Children Projected Reduction in Spec-Ed Assignment for 500 Students Comparison of Number of At-Risk Children in Special Education With and Without PFS Scholarships 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 102 PFS Project Year Total Number of Children in K-12 Number of Children in Spec-ed without PFS Number of Children in Spec-ed with PFS Number of Children Projected Spec-Ed Cost Avoidance for 500 Students $1,200,000 $1,000,000 $800,000 $600,000 $400,000 $200,000 $0 103 PFS Project Year Special Education Cost Without PFS Project Special Education Cost With PFS Project Comparison of Special Education Cost With and Without PFS Project  Description of the Financing Model: Fixed-Debt a. Investors receive fixed interest and principal payments on a loan or bond with a given maturity, such as five or ten years. b. Investor funds are used to provide “scholarships” that pay for prekindergarten education services. c. Success Payments after interest expense accrues in a reserve account to be available for later payments of principal. Any amount in the reserve account after PRI investments are repaid are paid to the state. d. The timely payment of fixed-debt interest and principle is guaranteed by philanthropic foundation PRI investment commitments to cover periods of negative cash flow -- expected in the first few years when operating expenses exceed Success Payments, and when large payments need to be made to repay debt principle. 104 Fixed Debt Structure $3,500,000 $3,000,000 $2,500,000 $2,000,000 $1,500,000 $1,000,000 Sources of PFS Project Funds -- One Round of Financing for One Cohort of Children $500,000 $0 105 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 PFS Project Year Regional Philanthropy State Government PFS asset Investors Philanthropic PRIs  Fixed Debt Structure Cumulative PFS Success Payments, Fixed-Debt Repayment, and Reserve Account Balance Available for Distribution to State $8,000,000 $7,000,000 $6,000,000 $5,000,000 $4,000,000 $3,000,000 $2,000,000 $1,000,000 $0 -$1,000,000 106 or for Future Rounds of Pre-k Financing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 PFS Project Year Cumulative PFS special-ed cost avoidance PFS fixed-debt repayment Funds available for state budget or project expansion Philanthropic PRIs  Description of the Financing Model: Fixed-Debt PFS Project Results: PV of special-ed cost without PFS project $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 8,053,880 1,342,313 6,516,084 81% 5,864,476 73% 1,420,789 334,123 1,415,131 PV of special-ed cost with PFS project PV of special-ed cost avoidance (budget savings) Cost avoidance as a percent of special-ed cost without PFS PV of Success Payments to the Intermediary Success Payments as percent of special-ed cost without PFS Funding Source Amounts: PV of philanthropic grants PV of philanthropic PRIs PV of state government investment PV of federal government investment $- $ 4,245,393 $ 7,415,436 PV of private source investments PV of project funding from all sources 107 Results of the Financing Model: Fixed-Debt Investor Results: PV of Intermediary fixed-debt obligations acquired by Investors $ 4,245,393 PV of principle and interest payments to Investors $ 4,615,610 IRR to Investors (Yield to Maturity, not Coupon)) 4.17% Philanthropic PRI Results: PV of Intermediary PRI obligations acquired by philanthropies $ 334,123 PV of principle and interest payments to philanthropies $ 295,932 IRR to PRI investors  1.29% Government Results: PV of Government investment $ 1,415,131 PV of payments to Government less PRI for gen’l budget or more pre-k $ 1,121,823 IRR to State Government (incl inv inc & assuming PRI repay in 15th yr) 1.26% 108 Description of the Financing Model: Pass-through a. Investors receive annual payments consisting of a percentage of the Success Payments. b. These payments constitute interest payments and principle repayment. The actual yield on the Pass-Through depends on the amount and timing of the Success Payments. c. Pass-Through payments may vary from year to year because they depend directly on the amount of Success Payments actually earned. d. In the Pass-Through structure, the debt instrument stands on its own – neither payments nor a given return on investment are assured by philanthropic PRI investment commitments. e. Pass-Through obligations have higher investment risk than fixed-debt obligations. f. The state receives the success payments not paid to support the Pass-through in the year in which it occurs. 109 Description of the Financing Model: Pass-Through PFS Project Results: $ 8,053,880 $ 1,342,313 $ 6,516,084 81% $ 5,864,476 73% $ 1,420,789 $- $ 1,415,131 $- $ 4,245,393 $ 7,081,313 PV of special-ed cost without PFS project PV of special-ed cost with PFS project PV of special-ed cost avoidance (budget savings) Cost avoidance as a percent of special-ed cost without PFS PV of Success Payments to the Intermediary Success Payments as percent of special-ed cost without PFS Funding Source Amounts: PV of philanthropic grants PV of philanthropic PRIs PV of state government investment PV of federal government investment PV of private source investments PV of project funding from all sources 110 Results of the Financing Model: Pass-Through Investor Results: PV of Intermediary fixed-debt obligations acquired by Investors PV of pass-throughs to Investors $ 4,245,393 $ 5,181,264 6.0% 88.35% $- $- 0.00% $ 1,415,131 $ 683,211 -6.27% IRR to Investors (Percentage of Success Payments to Investors that Results in Requried IRR) Philanthropic PRI Results: PV of Intermediary PRI obligations acquired by philanthropies PV of principle and interest payments to philanthropies IRR to PRI investors Government Results: PV of Government investment PV of pass throughs to Government IRR to State Government (continuous payment) 111 112 Financial Model Projection Results Variations Variation A: Funding Source: 75% Investor, 10% state, 15% federal Fixed-Debt Structure Pass-through Structure 88.35% of Success Payments paid to Investor to reach Target Return IRR to the Investor 4.17% 6.00% IRR to PRI 1.29% 0% IRR to the State 8.28% 5.82% Variation B: Funding Source: 50% Investor, 50% state Fixed-Debt Structure Pass-through Structure IRR to the Investor 4.17% 6.00% 58.9% of Success Payments paid to Investor to reach Target Return IRR to PRI 1.39% 0% IRR to the State 2.14% 0.75% Variation C: Funding Source: 50% Investor, 25% state, 25% Federal Fixed-Debt Structure Pass-through Structure IRR to the Investor 4.17% 6.00% IRR to PRI 1.39% 0% IRR to the State   7.45% 11.63% 58.9% of Success Payments paid to Investor to reach Target Return Financial Model Projection Results: Sensitivity to Spec-ed Rate Variation A: Funding Source: 75% Investor, 10% state, 15% federal Fixed-Debt Structure Reduction of special education assignment rate due to PFS pre-k from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% IRR to the Investor 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% IRR to PRI 1.29% 1.23% 1.22% 1.22% Return too Return too IRR to the State 8.28% 5.34% 0.74% -11.96% low low Pass-through Structure Reduction of special education assignment rate due to PFS pre-k from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% Below target Below target Below target Below target IRR to the Investor 6.00% 6.00% rt rt rt rt % of Success Payment Payout 88.35% 94.65% Return too Return too Return too Return too IRR to the State 5.82% -5.48% low low low low 113  Financial Model Projection Results Sensitivity Analysis Variation C: Funding Source: 50% Investor, 25% state, 25% Federal Fixed-Debt Structure Reduction of special education assignment rate due to PFS pre-k from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% IRR to the Investor 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% IRR to PRI 1.39% 1.39% 1.39% 1.39% 1.39% 1.29% IRR to the State 7.45% 6.26% 4.88% 3.22% 1.13% -1.70% Pass-through Structure Reduction of special education assignment rate due to PFS pre-k from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to from 18% to 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% IRR to the Investor 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% % of Success Payment Payout 58.90% 63.10% 67.95% 73.65% 80.35% 88.35% IRR to the State 11.63% 8.54% 5.09% 1.10% -3.79% -10.59% 114 Conclusions and Future Research Implementing operational PFS projects will be helped if future research focuses on at least five areas of PFS finance: 1. Standard error estimates of the distribution of returns on PFS assets. 2. PFS project capital structures, risk, subordination and loss absorption. 3. Sensitivity analysis of returns to variations in parameter values and financial structures. 4. Pre, concurrent and post intervention data needed to evaluate near-term financial returns and longer- term all-in outcome improvements. 5. Research methodologies to use when needed data are limited. 115 Pay for Success Reading and Resource List -- ww.ReadyNation.org/PFS Working Papers for Discussion and Comment "Early Childhood Pay for Success Social Impact Finance: Organizational Steps, Memorandum of Understanding and Contract Outlines." Report of the ReadyNation Working Group on contracts in Early Childhood Social Impact Finance, ReadyNation Working Paper, June 10, 2013. "Financing Human Capital Development for Economically Disadvantaged Children: Applying Pay for Success Social Impact Finance to Early Child Development." Janis A. Dubno, Robert H. Dugger, and Michelle R. Smith. ReadyNation Working Paper, June 10, 2013 Click here to access the PFS Social Impact Finance Spreadsheet Recommended General Reading "Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local Governments." Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab (SIB Lab), Harvard Kennedy School. June 2013. "Pay for Success Financing." Community Development Investment Review 9 (1). Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. April 2013. "Case Study: Preparing for a Pay for Success Opportunity." Third Sector Capital Partners. April 2013. Megan Golden. "Developing a Social Impact Bond: Lessons from a Provider." The Children's Aid Society. January 2013. Laura Callanan, Jonathan Law, and Lenny Mendonca. "From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the U.S." McKinsey & Company. May 2012. “What Is Pay for Success?” Third Sector Capital Partners. October 2012. "A New Tool for Scaling Impact: How Social Impact Bonds Can Mobilize Private Capital to Advance Social Good."Social Finance. October 2012. Michael Bloomberg, City of New York, "Bringing Social Impact Bonds to New York City" August 2012. Jeffrey Liebman. "Social Impact Bonds: A Promising New Financing Model to Accelerate Social Innovation and 116 Improve Government Performance." Center for American Progress. February 2011.  117 APPENDIX C: September 10, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting • September 10, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting Agenda • September 10, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting Notes • September 2013 Survey Results • Presentation by Ms. Rebecca Leventhal – Maryland Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Working Group Meeting #2 • Presentation by Ms. Kristin Misner – Bringing Social Impact Bonds to New York City Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Tuesday, September 10, 2013 9:00 am to 12:30 pm The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, UM SSW 306 W. Redwood Street, Baltimore Workgroup Meeting #2 Agenda Workgroup Goal: Report to the House Appropriations Committee on the merits of Social Impact Bonds (SIB) and their relevance and applicability to Maryland. Meeting Goals: Identify 1) how Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are being measured; 2) which savings go to investors; and, 3) which applications will work under the SIB model? 9:00-9:30 am 9:30-10:15 am 10:15-11:00 am 11:00-11:15 am 11:15am-12:00pm 12:00-12:30pm Discuss results of the participant survey (Michelle Zabel) Presentation by Jeffrey B. Liebman, PhD, Malcolm Wiener Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Dr. Liebman will present on his work with SIB pilot tests, including the Massachusetts SIB project (authorized by the Legislature to work on SIB initiatives involving individuals who are homeless and youth involved with the criminal justice system). Presentation by Rebecca Leventhal, Director on the Business Development Team Ms. Leventhal will present on Social Finance’s SIB projects, including in the UK (Peterborough) and Fresno, CA. The Peterborough SIB involves recidivism for parolees, and the Fresno SIB is to reduce the need for children in the area to visit emergency rooms and hospitalization for asthma problems. Break Presentation by Kristin Misner, Chief of Staff to the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services in the Office of the Mayor, New York City Ms. Misner will present on the NYC SIB effort that included Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg Foundation, the Mayor’s Office, and the NYC Department of Corrections to implement a program for 16- to 18-year-olds detained at Rikers Island with the goal of reducing the high recidivism rate for this population by focusing on personal responsibility education, training, and counseling. Facilitated Workgroup Discussion SIB Summer Study Contact: Roann Tsakalas, rtsakalas@msde.state.md.us , (410)767-7802 Next Meeting: Monday, October 7, 2013, 9AM-12:30PM 118 Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Tuesday, September 10, 2013 9:00 am to 12:30 pm The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, UM SSW 306 W. Redwood Street, Baltimore Workgroup Meeting #2 Workgroup Goal: Report to the House Appropriations Committee on the merits of Social Impact Bonds (SIB) and their relevance and applicability to Maryland. Meeting Goals: Identify 1) how Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are being measured; 2) which savings go to investors; and, 3) which applications will work under the SIB model? Meeting Notes: Members in Attendance: Michelle Zabel, The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, Chair Nathan W. Bowen, Department of Budget & Management Donna Riley (for Marcella Franczkowski), Maryland State Department of Education Jeanne-Marie Holly, Maryland State Department of Education Farid Keshavarz, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services Delegate Samuel Rosenberg, Maryland General Assembly Dan Feller, Governor’s Office for Children Netsanet Kibret, Department of Human Resources Miriam Shark, Annie E. Casey Foundation Margaret Williams, Maryland Family Network Terry Staudenmaier, Abell Foundation Rolf Grafwallner, Maryland State Department of Education Al Zachick, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Ilise Marrazzo, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Observers: George Failla, Caroline Boice, Steven Schreiber Stahl Staff: John Spears, Roann Tsakalas, Deborah Harburger Discuss results of the participant survey- Deborah Harburger reviewed the survey findings (see handout). Workgroup members will receive basically the same survey after this meeting to see if some questions were answered by the presenters and if participants’ feelings have changed. The workgroup reviewed the notes from the July meeting, and Miriam moved for approval of the notes and Margaret seconded. The notes were approved. Thoughts shared by members:  LMBs were interested in the idea of using bonds to pay for intervention services.  Speakers added value to what members already knew.  Early childhood is difficult to find the payoff because the dividends are realized so much further down the road and therefore hard to cash in on. 119 120  Member suggested that asthma would be a place where savings are seen up front but the devil is in the details.  It is important for the group to hear about the downside of SIBs. Asthma example is tough because managed care for Medicaid would realize the savings. Is it worth the cost of the borrowing?  Are there things that we should be doing now that we are not doing and we could finance through a SIB. It was suggested that perhaps the Department of Juvenile Services may have a program that would benefit.  Ask in the next survey about specific programs that could work.  Lead paint exposure abatement as savings down the road.  Early identification of programs to scale – home visiting, early childhood, expanded school mental health – take a few jurisdictions where we know there are problems, and take the continuum of services to full scale.  Members should think about grants that you have applied for and think about some savings that you may realize that may be a conversation for a SIB. Michelle Zabel introduced Dr. Liebman - Dr. Liebman is a Malcolm Wiener Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Dr. Liebman presented on his work with SIB pilot tests, including the Massachusetts SIB project. First, Dr. Liebman described what the process has been like in New York and Massachusetts. Second, he will provide lessons learned. The idea of SIBs has spread faster than he thought. For 3 years, President Obama has put SIBs in his budget, New York City has started implementation of their project, New York State and Massachusetts have gone through procurement to put together projects. Massachusetts projects are for the homeless and juvenile offenders. New York State’s SIB is for adult offenders. The Rockefeller foundation has enabled Dr. Liebman has placed a full time staff in Massachusetts and New York State to help put together the projects. This has expanded to 10 states – see map in presentation. Three currents have come together to push SIBs forward – 1. Much more measuring of outcomes of social programs is needed; 2. In the current budgetary environment when no government can afford to keep doing what it is doing much less start something new; and 3. The sense that we are not making enough progress on social problems. There is a sense that “something is broken” here. There are innovative non profits doing successful things but no evaluation to support their work. SIBs may be a way to scale up successful programs and fund innovative approaches to social programs. Steps in Massachusetts and New York State that made “Pay for Success” an option. 1. Decide it is a good fit for your goal. 2. Senior government person (champion) that thinks this is going to work. It takes a year to put together, and someone has to own this, such as the Governor or Mayor. 3. A SIB is not worth doing for small objectives. Envision a big impact for an entire population, and make it a top priority. A small program that has a path to go statewide. It is best if the big goal is on the top 5 or 10 list of chief executive. 4. Choose a project that you can share across government agencies. So that agencies can share data and break down barriers to measure over time. New York State can now follow juvenile offenders through state education and other agencies’ data systems into adulthood. Implementing a SIB is a 3 track process –  Experts in government need to brainstorm where a SIB would fit. Is there an underinvestment in prevention? Are there good programs that were cut in the budget cycle? Could a good evaluation bring out the value of the program? Are their programs with long wait lists? Should get 30 or 40 ideas for a potential “Pay for Success” program.  Then you find that half the programs on your list can’t measure success. So you could do an RFI to get additional ideas.  Examine lists of proven programs nationally from other places for serious consideration.  Need to be sure providers of services are in the local community. This whittling down process helps you to see what you want to go forward on. What will give you the big benefit? Does it have scalability? Is there an effective way to evaluate the outcomes? Government needs to decide what it can handle –more than 3 SIBs would be crazy. Conduct a real procurement process to get partners. Massachusetts let 2 RFPs for intermediaries, and then one for the provider of service. New York State asked for bids from teams (intermediary and provider as a team). There are lots of ways to do this. Question –Cost benefit analysis: What is needed to do this? Response - Have to do some initial rough cost benefit analysis. There must be potential for high net benefit. What do we think is out there for program models that would provide benefits? Recidivism is a good example. Government must do a lot of data work to prepare for receiving the RFPs: (1) Government must conduct a vigorous cost analysis to see what it is willing to pay for the reduction based on 10% or 12% or 15% for example. This is the payment schedule and is needed for the procurement process. (2) How many people are you trying to serve? Where are they geographically? How much additional service are you adding (data work)? Can you use historical data from specific providers of service and compare their results? (3) Do you have the legislative authority to support the SIB? Are your evaluation partners in place? (4) In order to enter into negotiations you must have exact payment terms for providers. The government must have a view of its savings before negotiating. The benefits must be above the cost of services. The range of outcomes and benefits must be higher than the costs so that a project can get done. 121 122 (5) Negotiate how much savings go to investors and what savings go to government. The surplus is shared through the contract. Investors get most of the savings. (6) Need a plan in place for when the project is over so that if it is successful you capitalize on the work and go forward. Lessons learned – • It is hard to find solid evidence that a project is going to work. There are a lot of innovative programs but even the best often lack full proof evaluations. If a SIB is using an innovative program without solid evaluation, you will learn more because you are testing things but investors are taking on more risk. • In this circumstance the structure of investment will require more socially minded investors. For example, in New York City the Bloomberg Foundation backed the SIB project to provide some protection for the investors. Goldman Sachs risked $2m to make $2m more. Goldman has a 50-50 gamble on the project. Most projects will not have such a generous back stop. In New York City, the government will absorb at least one quarter of the risk, investors will take one quarter of the risk, and the foundation half of the risk. • The SIB contract states who gets paid back first and what percentage or amount they get of the savings. Then, as you go down the list and distribute the money, some down the list may not get paid back. Other contracts may stipulate that there are multiple pay backs but no one gets the full amount back that they invested. • The major point to remember is that there is a lot of risk. A government will not do this with all investors’ money. • You can have a situation where everything goes right, but other external factors such as unemployment rises and/or crime goes up and interferes with the effect. So the program works but the data does not demonstrate it. Use a comparison group to mitigate this risk and show how the program performed. This is the reason for a detailed evaluation plan. • One of the greatest benefits of the SIBs is that contracts are binding so that if the administration changes, actors need to continue with the contract. The long term plan is committed in the contract and should ensure no changes to the SIB. • The SIB project has to last at least 3 years to realize good data. Dr. Liebman pushes regularly for projects of at least 4 years duration in order to assemble evidence for the renewal of the project. • Dr. Liebman is still trying to see what risk tolerance that investors have. New York State’s programs are known to be effective in the community and it was easier to sell the investor, but it is still too early to know. • The SIB must serve at least a couple hundred of people in order to have a good sample size for the data. Michelle Zabel introduced Ms. Rebecca Leventhal – Ms. Leventhal presented on Social Finance’s SIB projects, including in the UK (Peterborough) and Fresno, CA. The Peterborough SIB involves recidivism for parolees, and the Fresno SIB is 123 to reduce the need for children in the area to visit emergency rooms and hospitalization for asthma problems. How is social finance is different from other presenters? • Jeff is an advisor to governments. Social Finance (SF) deals with the government leaders and acts as an intermediary in the SIB process. See PowerPoint presentation, slide 4 which lays out the key steps to launching and implementing successful SIBs. Rebecca explained that a lot of work comes from government side in step 1. The government’s cost benefit analysis is crucial in finding the savings. • Key questions: What is the government’s willingness to pay because cost benefit may be after the 3 years of the contract? Social Finance works with investors to see what they are willing to accept. • SF works with providers and investors to determine what the right investment model is, and what the right metric is to measure success. What can be monetized? Does one outcome speak more to the theory of change than another? What is the outcome number that allows the government to pay out the savings? • The ability of tapping into capital markets is unique here, and is extremely valuable. Don’t underestimate their ability to be important players. • SF works to raise the capital. In the NYC SIB, the provider had a 30 year history of good service, and was a good match to implement this new intervention. But because the type of program was new to the provider, the risk for the new program was high, so investors were not willing to step up. So the Bloomberg Foundation has backed stopped the SIB. NYC wants to use the SIB to spur innovation in human services. In other deals, you are seeing more strongly evidenced programs that are already implemented in the state, and have external evaluations with detailed data to show how participants gained from programs. This affects what kind of capital comes into the deal. What makes for a good SIB project? • Good SIB projects will work best when government knows the program is effective and does not have money to implement it. SF taps into capital markets that normally are not accessible to these projects. It is a delicate balance to be sure when you are building the kinds of models that will be able to spur more capital investment. • The right mix of philanthropy and capital to support the transaction in the long term will create a market for the program down the road. SF acts as the issuing agency. Step 5, slide 4 – project management must make course corrections as needed and evaluate the data constantly. The intermediary can deliberate the contract if situations change (i.e. problem is changed based on external circumstances). SF is funded a few ways: philanthropy (the Rockefeller Foundation) has funded them which provided some flexibility to push the SIB effort forward. In the long term, SF’s goal is to become self sustaining and to find financing in the overall transaction. Right now sometimes, SF is paid by government up front to develop the transaction or through savings. SF also receives many combinations. Government has used executive office budgets to contract with SF because the cost has been under $100k. 124 Slide 5 lists SIB risks. Data helps mitigate the risk for investors. Execution risk is the risk that implementation falls short for various reasons. It is important to mitigate execution risk upfront by identifying needs for support prior to the provider’s implementation. Right now, SIBs are too new to see investors back out of deals. Active project management is important to mitigate this. Government’s risk is of defaulting. Massachusetts appropriated $50m in savings to protect the investors. NYC has not made any legislative changes, but the Bloomberg Foundation has created protections and the contract can protect the investors. In Fresno the State/local government is not involved, but rather the California Endowment. In the UK SIB, the contracting party is the Ministry of Justice, and both the Ministry of Justice and the National Lottery are lending important support. The UK does not have a specific law to protect the investors. Slide 6, in a SIB the benefit/cost savings must exceed the cost of intervention. The SIB contract must have an acceptable length of time for investors. You don’t want it to be too long to see results. From the PR standpoint, the emphasis on criminal justice, the current issue, is a disadvantage. Investors are interested in deals in early childhood. Because they want something more story worthy. High net worth clients sell the investment with early childhood to tell a better story, and health also makes for an appealing story. You want to get a max bang for your buck and cause no harm. Question: how are savings realized by government to pay back investors? • In Massachusetts the project is to reduce the number of chronically homeless that go to ERs too often. First, they are addressing housing to lower ER visits. 400 homeless people targeted. By reducing hospital costs, Massachusetts wants to reduce the amount of money the state is paying out every year in perpetuity. One goal may be to reduce recidivism by 10% for example. Government agrees to bear risk to a certain point in the contract. Government pays back the negotiated amount in the contract. Government has said that if we get back in the end that is good. Massachusetts is not worried about the payout. Government sees benefit to taxpayers over the long haul. This is the art of putting a deal together. Slide 12 demonstrates the Fresno, CA SIB. The goal is to reduce asthma incidence in children. Existing data did not show a connection to saving money. This project is trying to realize and document the economic savings of this work, and is not a SIB at this time, but rather a Pre-SIB. The grant from the California Endowment is covering the cost of the project. The provision of service is asthma education in order to reduce hospital visits. The project is studying cost reductions to State Medicaid and also private payors. The SIB will also look at economic effects on parents who are hourly wage workers and are able to go work more steadily. Fresno hopes to take to the project to scale as a SIB. The current Pre-SIB is an18 month project, launched in May and beginning to serve people in late August. States would be able to access President Obama’s $300m in his Pya-for-Success initiative to pay the federal portion of savings for a state SIB project if it were to be passed by Congress. That would create some support for savings realized in federally funded programs. 125 Question: is legislation needed? Do investors need protection? Do agencies need authority to do this? • Other states have not gotten into these questions prior to getting into a SIB. So they are doing a look back in some cases. Massachusetts did do the legislation prior to SIB and created the fund. Philanthropy is the hardest capital to bring on board. Michelle Zabel introduced Ms. Kristin Misner– Ms. Kristin Misner, Chief of Staff to the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services in the Office of the Mayor, New York City presented on New York City’s Rikers Island SIB. The partners in the NYC SIB include Goldman Sachs, the Bloomberg Foundation, the Mayor’s Office, and the NYC Department of Corrections. Corrections is implementing a program for 16- to 18-year-olds detained at Rikers Island with the goal of reducing the high recidivism rate for this population by focusing on personal responsibility education, training, and counseling (in a program called ABLE, for Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience). Ms. Misner said that “everyone [in City government] felt excited about the endeavor.” It was people’s “second or third” job, working evenings and weekends to make it happen. SIBs are appropriate for effective programs where savings can be realized, and services that are not mandated. The third party evaluator is necessary to ensure that services are delivered according to contract. Why was a young men’s initiative pursued by for NYC? The purpose is to give juvenile offenders hope and a future, and change the trajectory for young men so that Rikers is not their way of life. NYC wants these success stories to set examples for younger kids. Mayor Bloomberg’s launched Young Men’s Initiative was a high priority for his third term, and this SIB is part of this initiative. Department heads were asked to think of programs and ideas to make a difference for these young men. There were no new dollars for a new program but there was a passion for this program. The SIB created the ability to think about transformative initiatives. Various ideas were vetted with investors. Slide 3, MDRC is the intermediary and provides the evaluation. There is a lot of evaluation on this approach. They are using the ABLE curriculum (cognitive behavioral therapy recommended by MDRC) because it works well with participants who may drop in and out unpredictably. The service is being delivered to 3,000 young men served each year over 4 years, both on Rikers and in the neighborhoods. The program went full scale in January 2013. Two non profits are delivering the service. The goals are to reduce incarceration and crime. There was a goal for 20% reduction of recidivism for the 1st year of the program, but a breakeven point at 10%. The Budget Office and the Dept of Corrections negotiated the cost structure for the program. Slide 4, how did we do this? First NYC established a baseline, and looked at a 5 year cohort based on bed use at Rikers. The cost saving is realized by reducing the number of bed days. There was a lot of back and forth with the budget office and Corrections on what would be 126 saved. The savings are small until avoiding the return of 100 adolescents, at which point the savings are boosted to $100,000 per adolescent because a wing could close. What percentage of beds do we need to save in order to see a savings for all parties to the contract? Ten percent and NYC would save $9.6m. Slide 5, lists the actors and their roles and costs. Slide 7 lists the pay outs. 8.4% reduction would enable NYC to pay back investors. 10% reduction is a break even for the city. If the reduction is at 20% then the city keeps all the savings above 10%. The project will have a “go no-go” decision in Year 3 based on the recidivism in the first annual cohort, with a 9% rate being the threshold. During constrained government funding, SIBs are a way to fund innovative strategies/programs. The SIB helped the non profits to continue to serve this population and not reduce service completely, which happens with a budget cut. They also reduce risks for government and quantify the social benefits. There is real value in deciding what a high school diploma is worth, whether $10,000 or some other number. Question: Are there annual milestones? Or are they calculated by the full length of the project? • NYC set 2 markers for recidivism at the end of year 1 and year 2. So at end of year 3, you see the first cohort over 2 years. After year 3, if 9% or greater have not come back to Rikers, then NYC pays out. Then after year 4, after 2 years of lower recidivism, then a payout. Question: how did you balance what happened in the community vs. the service on Riker’s with the Budget Office? • They involved budget office in the planning of the evaluation. The evaluation was quasi historical and looked back at a cohort which was divided into a treatment group, and a control group at Rikers. Presentations ended, and Michelle stated that Dr. Liebman’s questions in his presentation would be in the survey to the work group. Then, work group members shared their thoughts about SIBs? • Great job jumping into this issue. State agencies need to do a feasibility study to see what programs would work. Programs do cross agencies. Data analysis needs to be done internally before negotiations begin. In the current political climate, we may not have a champion in place at this time. • It could be something that is a new job for someone. Managing a SIB cannot be added to a present employee’s plate. • How do we build to scale initiatives that we have going to get capital? It is a bi-partisan concept. • How could this work for childhood hunger? The benefits to reducing hunger are disbursed across agencies but it is not easy to measure. • Is the SIB the right financing option? Or are other options presented at meeting 1 better for Maryland? 127 • Deborah has a web site for public policy that lists an inventory of savings in various human service areas. • Currently, there is $2m in early intervention for mental health for children zero to five. It would be beneficial to increase funding to realize greater results through behavioral mental health programs. Staff will develop a survey based on information provided by the presenters to create some guidance for agency conversations. It is important for members to provide feedback through the survey for the development of the first draft of the report, which will be reviewed at the October 7th meeting. The Chair, Ms. Zabel, thanked everyone for coming and thanked the speakers for their participation. She also reminded the group that the next meeting will be on Monday, October 7 from 9 am to 12:30 pm at the Institute for Innovation and Implementation. The meeting adjourned at 12:30 pm. Approved at October 7, 2013 meeting. Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Participant Survey Results September 10, 2013 This survey was issued to all Social Impact Bond (SIB) Summer Study Workgroup members and designed to serve as a check-in with all participants to identify current thinking about and questions regarding SIBs in general and in Maryland. This survey will be re-administered after each of the SIB Workgroup Meetings. 1. Did you attend the first meeting of the SIB Summer Study Workgroup (Wednesday, July 17, 2013)? There were 11 respondents to the survey; 6 of them attended the first meeting of the SIB Summer Study Workgroup on Wednesday, July 17, 2013. (All participants have received materials regardless of attendance at the meeting.) 2. What information about SIBs (either from the meeting or the resources shared) have surprised you or challenged your ideas about SIBs? • Presentation by Dr. Salamon about the variety of new financing options through the private market • The fiscal analysis done by the Department of Legislative Services is sobering. • I was surprised to discover the breadth of literature in this area as it is relatively new to me. I was also interested to learn of the existing SIBs and their structure. • I like the model in concept, am still trying to understand the complexities of the financing mechanism and am concerned about what sound like high legal and transactional costs of creating a SIB. Also, if an investor requires a guarantee, as in the NYC Rikers Island SIB, that would make it more expensive and more difficult to put in place. • It was a wonderful learning experience for me. I was only vaguely familiar with social impact bonds and I learned a lot about the types of initiatives around SIB. The resources provided a great background. • There is often significant private capital spurring development like the Bloomberg example in NY (6 respondents) 3. Questions about SIBs: I have questions about SIBs in relation to: 128 Answer Determining the population focus 3 7 8 4 • 4 Organizing the financing for the SIB Recouping savings from the SIB Response 4 Challenges to developing and implementing a SIB Benefits of implementing a SIB Other (please state): Clarifying the purpose/best use and expected results in addition to financing benefits (if any). • I am unfamiliar with this issue (11 respondents) 4a. Based on the information you have received to-date, on a scale of 1-10, do you think a SIB could work for Maryland in the next few years? (1=SIBs are not at all feasible or realistic for Maryland in the next few years; 10=SIBs could definitely be implemented in Maryland to implement in the next few years) Min Max Average Standard Value Value Value Deviation Responses 5.22 3.00            8.00                 1.86          9 4b. Please explain your rating in 4a. • Under the MD School Construction law, the State subsidizes the construction of school buildings, including early learning sites on the campus of the renovated or newly constructed sites. The State match depends on the local wealth of the jurisdiction. The local share could be supplemented with SIB funds for the construction of an state-of-the art early learning center. The occupant of the center would pay interest on the bond in lieu of rent, e.g. $2,500 monthly on a bond of $1 mi with 3% interest. The term of the bond could be structured to benefit the investor from community development tax credits. • Maryland has greater capacity than many states and could certainly master the technical and financing details. But for SIBs to be worth the time and effort invested, they have to achieve something beyond financial repayment. Are there programs within state government with the desire and capacity to use SIBs to accomplish reforms? • I think that fiscal constraints, logistical concerns, and the annual focus of the budget (rather than longer term) present very large hurdles for the implementation of SIBs in Maryland. However, there is obviously some interest in the State in moving forward with a SIB of some form. 129 • With a restructuring of current State resources there is a likely potential for a SIB to work in Maryland. • Given that these have been done successfully elsewhere it seems feasible, and it may be a good way to raise funds needed to scale up promising programs, but it sounds like questions related to the financing mechanism may make it difficult. Also I think Maryland has generally done a reasonably good job of funding social programs with public dollars so there may be a question whether we need a private investor that will receive a potentially generous return. • My response is based upon the fact that I still feel I need to know more about SIB. In some instances, if there were adequate investors, I believe that it could work. • There needs to be a continuation of political will through the change in Administration. • We would still need to educate public policy experts, elected officials and the general public on this issue. The issue does not have a "champion" at the moment. Not many model SIBs in existence. 4c. If you answered with a rating of 5 or greater on question 4a (could SIBs work in Maryland), what are the populations and programs that you think could potentially be feasible for a SIB in Maryland? • Aging seniors, child welfare, juvenile justice, early childhood. • Young children and their families birth – 5 • Early childhood programs -- e.g., home visiting or early childhood education; programs to reduce chronic homelessness; prisoner re-entry; programs to reduce number of youth in foster care • Workforce re-entry/DPSCS population. 5. What additional information would you like to receive to assist with the development of the recommendation to the General Assembly? • A description of an existing model and its funding arrangement is needed to articulate the feasibility to legislators. However, the example listed above (SIB funded early learning center being part of school construction request) would not require legislation. • What/where is the appetite for program innovations/reforms within state government where SIBs could be a useful tool? • More detail regarding the legal/budgetary roadblocks that exist in Maryland, and how the State could overcome these hurdles. • I would like to hear about more areas that are using SIB to solve problems as was stated in the first meeting. • I would like more information on quantifying the savings over time as that is often compelling for legislators 130 MARYLAND SOCIAL IMPACT BOND SUMMER STUDY 2013 WORKING GROUP MEETING # 2 SEPTEMBER 10 2013 Rebecca Leventhal rleventhal@socialfinanceUS.org 617.939.9900 x 26 131 77 Summer Street, 2nd Floor, Boston, MA 02110 SOCIAL INNOVATION FINANCING OVERVIEW 132  AN INNOVATIVE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIP 2 STRUCTURE, COORDINATE, MANAGE RISK INVESTORS (e.g., recoverable grants, CRA investments, institutional assets) 1 INVEST 7 RETURN INTERMEDIARY (e.g., Social Finance, local foundations, local service provider coordinators) SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS (e.g., nonprofits, B-corps, for-profits) 6 PAY FOR SUCCESS OUTCOME PAYORS (e.g., government, foundations, corporations) 5 MEASURE AND VALIDATE INDEPENDENT VALIDATORS (e.g., evaluation firm, academics, consultants) 3 DELIVER POPULATIONS IN NEED (e.g., homeless, formerly incarcerated, at-risk youth, aging seniors) 4 ACHIEVE OUTCOMES 133  KEY STEPS TO LAUNCHING AND IMPLEMENTING SUCCESSFUL SIBS 1 2 • • Secure Government Contract Develop & secure government contract Secure authorization for multi-year contract − Address appropriation risk Formulate partnership agreement with metrics & payment terms 3 • • • 4 5 Manage Project Over Instrument’s Life • Provide active ongoing project management and financial intermediation • Make course corrections as needed • Coordinate third-party evaluation Originate Deal Structure Instrument Develop operating model & structure investment vehicle Articulate cash flows, including financial & social returns for target milestones Finalize methodology, including metrics & evaluation strategy Raise Capital Recruit investors − Foundations & charitable trusts − High net-worth individuals & family offices − Institutional investors Issue the instrument & raise investment capital • Identify government champions & savings opportunities • Vet proven models of intervention • Perform nonprofit due diligence • Conduct financial modeling • • • 134 Active Risk Management  BUILDING AN INSTRUMENT: SIB RISKS Nonprofits 1 2 Intervention Model Risk Execution Risk • Risk that intervention is not effective in achieving success metrics • Risk that program is not effectively implemented by service providers • Risk that program is not well-managed by intermediary, or that intermediary is not well-managed • Risk that investors do not meet funding commitments if capital is called over multiple periods Performance Risk Intermediary Investors 3 Intermediary Risk 4 Investor Funding Risk Credit Enhancement and/or Tranched Structure to Mitigate Above Risks 5 Credit Risk • Risk that government defaults on payments Government 135 6 Political Risk • Appropriation risk  SOCIAL IMPACT BOND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA Social Impact Bond Application Criteria Evidence-based programs helping underserved populations • Service providers with proven track record • Intervention with measurable outcomes • Attributable impact to intervention Potential for significant net savings or value creation • Policy priority for government or foundation • • Financing needs currently not served Acceptable investment time horizon • Area of interest for investors Replicable and Scalable • Provider readiness for scale • Strong social need • No harm 136  PROMISING APPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS Preliminary Assessment CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE Prisoner Recidivism Post-incarceration programs to reduce recidivism Juvenile Justice / Disconnected Youth Post/pre-adjudication intervention services to reduce out-of- home placements HEALTH CARE Aging in Place / Long- term Care Supportive housing and care coordination to reduce out-of- home healthcare usage School-based Health Clinics In-school primary care to reduce medical costs and improve outcomes Asthma Prevention Education and home retrofits to reduce asthma-related emergencies Nurse Home Visiting Programs Prenatal and early childhood support for first time, low-income mothers to improve family success OTHER Chronic Homelessness “Housing first” supportive housing to reduce emergency health care and shelter usage Adult Education Job training for hard-to-employ populations to fill skill gaps Early Education Providing all children with the tools necessary to begin school ready to learn 137 Aligns with most assessment criteria Aligns with some assessment criteria Does not align with assessment criteria  CASE STUDIES 138  CASE STUDY: OPERATIONAL SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS Peterborough Social Impact Bond • Peterborough SIB was launched in 2010; UK Ministry of Justice contracted with Social Finance for a 7.5% reduction in recidivism • Social Finance developed the concept and worked to structure and implement project o Collaborated with government and providers to identify service needs and appropriate metric o Designed program that had flexibility to adapt to client needs in real time o Implemented data management system to allow for real time collection of data and data driven decision making o Brought multiple providers together to coordinate services and align effort towards achievement of common outcome • Partners felt community confidence in program was key to success o Social Finance established advisory committee of leading experts and local stakeholders to provider oversight and credibility to project • In addition to raising capital and structuring the financing, Social Finance has also played the ‘program intermediary’ role o Social Finance has supported the implementation of the project and funded a full time project manager to oversee project and provide course corrections where necessary 139  THE WORLD’S FIRST SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AT PETERBOROUGH Funds Flow and Structure Investors 1 Net IRR up to 13% over 8 years £5M 6 Intermediary Social Finance UK Outcome Payors UK Ministry of Justice & Big Lottery Fund 5 Payment if predefined metrics are met 2 Funds and manages proven re-entry programs Nonprofit Nonprofit Re-Entry Service Providers The One*Service Nonprofit Other St. Giles Ormiston Trust YMCA Social outcome: Lower recidivism against control group 3 4 Target Population 140 3,000 male short-term prisoners released from Peterborough prison  CASE STUDIES: DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS Fresno Asthma Management Project • The California Endowment awarded Social Finance and Collective Health a grant to work with proven providers in the Fresno, California area to implement an asthma management and prevention program for 200 low-income children. • Goal to improve the health of children living with asthma and reduce the costs associated with emergency room treatments and hospitalizations. • Social Finance is financial intermediary and Collective Health plays operational intermediary role • Project is intended to substantiate social and financial benefits of up-front investment in effective asthma management • Social Finance endeavors to prove cost-savings from asthma intervention can be achieved and quantified. • If pilot proves successful, partners will launch SIB to serve broader population 141  FRESNO DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: GRANT TO SIB MODEL The California Endowment 1 TCE Provides grant 2b Funds working capital Asthma Management Service Providers Management Intermediary: Social Finance 2a Funds operations Performance 3 management Operational Intermediary: Collective Health Clinica Sierra Vista Central California Asthma Collaborative 3 Provide services Target Population 200 children high-risk children 142  OVERVIEW OF US SIB ACTIVITY 143  SIGNIFICANT INTEREST ACROSS THE COUNTRY Active SIB Projects, Legislation, and Technical Assistance Pursued Fresno San Diego County Santa Clara County State of California Connecticut District of Columbia Maryland Massachusetts New Jersey New York City New York State Pennsylvania Rhode Island Legend Active SIB Projects (Proposed or Launched) Legislation (Pursuing or Passed) Harvard TA Lab Other Interest (Working Groups, Feasibility Studies, etc) 144 \  FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ACTIVITY • President Obama’s FY2014 budget increased support for Pay for Success, including: o $195M in support of PFS in areas of job training, education, criminal justice, housing, and disability services o $300M Incentive Fund at Treasury to provide credit enhancement and to supplement outcomes payments (akin to UK’s Outcomes Finance Fund) • Department of Justice and Department of Labor are providing funding for PFS pilots Strong Federal Interest • NYS General Assembly approved $30M in Pay for Success over next 5 years • NYS and NYC have both begun procurement processes; IL began RFI process Spring 2013 • New Jersey, Maryland, California, Texas, Hawaii and Pennsylvania are all considering PFS legislation • 28 jurisdictions applied to Jeff Liebman’s Harvard Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab for pro bono assistance Increasing Activity at State/Local Level 145 Transactions Moving Forward • NYC launched nation’s first SIB at Rikers Island; focus on youthful offenders • NYS selected Social Finance as intermediary for SIB financing workforce reentry program • Social Finance and Collective Health were awarded a grant from the California Endowment to launch a Health Impact Bond demonstration project • Massachusetts is contracting to launch financings focused on juvenile justice and chronic homelessness • Early education demonstration project launched in Utah © Social Finance 2013  ABOUT SOCIAL FINANCE 146  147 MISSION AND VALUES We believe that everyone deserves the opportunity to thrive, and that social impact financing can play a catalytic role in creating these opportunities. Our mission is to mobilize investment capital to drive social progress We structure and manage impact investments that will unlock capital to fund effective solutions and drive an outcomes-focused social sector. Social Finance is a registered 501(c)(3) organization. Our sister firm, Social Finance UK, launched the world’s first Social Impact Bond in 2010. We work closely together but are independently funded, managed and governed. • SF US: Launched operations in 2011 • SF UK: Founded in 2007 • Common mission, model and knowledge platform • People: People are our mission and our inspiration; we are committed to our team, our partners, and the individuals we serve. • Performance: Our work demands rigorous thought, inquiry, and analysis; we pride ourselves on the depth and quality of our endeavors. • Collaboration: We build strong, enduring relationships across sectors to align diverse interests and advance our collective mission. • Integrity: The highest standards of accountability and transparency underpin all of our work. © Social Finance 2013 WhoWeAre History Core Values OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS Our Focus is on the Social Impact Bond* Advisory Work • Feasibilitystudies • Developmentandimplementationofproof-of-conceptprojects Transaction Execution • Costbenefitanalysis • Financial structuring • Outcome metric selection and evaluation design • Contractdevelopment • Capitalraising • Performance and fiscal management • Accountingandcompliance • Investorrelations Post Transaction Support Field Building • Marketeducation,thoughtleadership,researchandadvocacytosupportthe development of a strong and sustainable Social Impact Bond and broader impact investment market 148 * Social Impact Bonds are not traditional government issued bond and are also referred to as pay for success, pay for performance, social innovation financing, or outcomes-based financing © Social Finance 2013  WHAT WE DO Our work spans geographies and issue areas; however, our fundamental approach is consistent. 1) Assess the Problem: First, we dive into the problem and ask: a) What is the problem? b) How big is the unmet need? c) Is there an intervention that can improve results? d) Can impact investing play a role? 2) Identify a Social Outcome Financing Solution: If a social impact financing strategy is appropriate , we identify promising ways to finance the expansion of programs with a track record of performance, a strong evidence base, and a focus on outcomes. 3) Shape the Partnership: We develop performance-based structures that align the incentives of government, investors and providers to achieve shared, measurable goals. 4) Raise Capital: We raise capital from impact investors to fund the initiative. 5) Collaborate through Completion: We work over the investment life with all stakeholders to ensure that social and financial goals are met. 149 © Social Finance 2013 SOCIAL FINANCE BOARD & TEAM BIOGRAPHIES 150  BOARD OF DIRECTORS David Blood, Chair, Finance and Investment Committee, is co-founder and Senior Partner of Generation Investment Management. Previously, he spent 18 years at Goldman Sachs including serving as co-CEO and CEO of Goldman Sachs Asset Management from 1999-2003. David received a B.A. from Hamilton College and an M.B.A. from the Harvard Graduate School of Business. He is on the Board of Harvest Power, New Forests, SHINE, Social Finance UK, Social Finance US, The Nature Conservancy, Fondation 1796 and Hamilton College; the Advisory Board of Bridges Ventures and the Harvard Business School Visiting Committee. Sir Ronald Cohen is Chairman of The Portland Trust , Bridges Ventures and Big Society Capital. He chaired the Social Investment Task Force (2000-2010) and the Commission on Unclaimed Assets (2005-2007). He was a co-founder and chairman of Apax Partners. He was a founding director of the British Venture Capital Association and the European Venture Capital Association. He was also a founder and former Vice-Chairman of EASDAQ and former director of NASDAQ Europe. He is a graduate of Oxford University, and Harvard Business School. He is a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers and the Board of Dean’s Advisers at Harvard Business School, a Vice-Chairman of Ben Gurion University and a member of the University of Oxford Investment Committee. He is also a Trustee of the British Museum. In 2007, Sir Ronald published The Second Bounce of the Ball – Turning Risk into Opportunity. Alexander Friedman is the Chief Investment Officer of UBS Wealth Management and chairman of its global investment committee. Prior to joining UBS, Alex was founder and managing partner of Asymmetry LLC, a private investment company, and senior advisor to Lazard, the international investment bank. Previously he was the Chief Financial Officer for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Earlier in his career, Alex was an investment banker at Lazard and also served as a White House fellow and as an assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration. Alex is chairman of Safeboats International and is a non-executive director of Actis. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he serves on the boards of the Seattle Art Museum and the Access Fund. Alex received a J.D. and an M.B.A. from Columbia University and a B.A. from Princeton University. Luther M. Ragin, Jr. is Chief Executive Officer of the Global Impact Investing Network. Previously, he was Chief Investment Officer of the F.B. Heron Foundation, a national foundation with assets of $250 million. Prior to joining the Foundation in 1999, Luther was the Chief Financial Officer of the National Community Capital Association, a trade association of community development financial institutions that provide access to capital in low-income communities. Other significant experience includes Earl G. Graves, Ltd., and Chase Manhattan Bank. Luther is a member of the Board of Directors of Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, ShoreBank Corporation and The Threshold Group. He holds a B.A. and Master of Public Policy from Harvard, and is a graduate of Columbia University's Executive Program in Business Administration. 151  BOARD OF DIRECTORS Sonal Shah, Vice Chair, is the former director of the White House’s Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation. She also served on President Obama's Transition Board overseeing the Technology, Innovation, Government Reform working group. Before joining the White House, Sonal was the head of Global Development Initiatives at Google.org. Prior to Google, she was Vice President at Goldman Sachs, Inc. Sonal also co-founded a nonprofit, Indicorps, which offers fellowships for Indian-Americans to work on development projects in India. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for American Progress and the Center for Global Development. From 1995-2002, Sonal was an economist at the Department of Treasury, where she was the Director for African Nations, worked on the Asian Financial Crisis and post-conflict development in Bosnia and Kosovo. Sonal received her M.A. in Economics from Duke University and B.A. in Economics from the University of Chicago. She is an Aspen Crown Fellow and a Next Generation Fellow. Dana Smith, Chair, Governance and Nomination Committee, serves as Trustee for two active family foundations, including the Richard and Susan Smith Family Foundation. Her past professional experience includes work at the Boston Housing Authority where she was Deputy Director of Services, Boys and Girls Clubs of Boston where she was Director of Operations and the City of Boston where she was a youth outreach worker. Dana is currently the incoming Chair of the Board at the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston and the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Facing History and Ourselves. She also serves on the boards of the Park School and the Dean’s Leadership Council at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Dana attended Tufts University and graduated in 1988 magna cum laude. After graduation, she received a fellowship to teach in SOWETO, South Africa. She completed her Masters in Education at Harvard University Graduate School of Education with a concentration in Children and Adolescents at Risk. Bracebridge H. Young, Jr., Chair of the Board, is Mariner’s Chief Executive Officer, a Partner and a General Securities Principal for Mariner Group Capital Markets Inc. He joined Mariner directly from Goldman Sachs, where he retired as a Partner, head of European Debt Capital Markets. Brace also headed fixed income and foreign exchange sales in London beginning in 1992. In 1989, Brace moved to Tokyo to run all of the firm’s fixed income activity in Japan. Brace first became a Partner at Goldman Sachs in New York City in 1988 where he was the Co-Head of the Money Market Sales and Trading Department. He was the Head Trader for institutional money market funds from 1983 to 1988 and started at Goldman Sachs on the Commercial Paper trading desk in 1980. Brace received a Bachelor’s degree from Bowdoin College in 1977 and an M.B.A. from the Stern School of New York University in 1983. He is the Chair of the Board and Trustee of Buckingham Browne & Nichols. 152  TEAM Tracy Palandjian, CEO and Co-founder For more than a decade, Tracy has dedicated herself to building a more impactful and effective nonprofit sector and to re-imagining the role of the capital markets in enabling social progress. Inspired by her work with its sister organization in the UK, Tracy co-founded Social Finance, Inc. in January 2011. Prior to Social Finance, Tracy was a Managing Director for 11 years at The Parthenon Group, a global strategy consulting firm, where she established and led the Nonprofit Practice and worked with foundations and NGOs to accomplish their missions in the US and globally. She is co-author of Investing for Impact: Case Studies Across Asset Classes, a report that provides an important view on the evolution of the impact investing industry. Prior to Parthenon, Tracy worked at Wellington Management Co. and McKinsey & Co. She is the Chair of the Board of Directors of Facing History and Ourselves, a member of the Board of Overseers at Harvard University and a Director of Affiliated Managers Group (NYSE: AMG). She also serves on the Investment Committee of Milton Academy. A native of Hong Kong, Tracy is fluent in Cantonese and Mandarin. She graduated magna cum laude from Harvard College, with a B.A. in Economics, and holds an M.B.A. with high distinction from Harvard Business School where she was a Baker Scholar. Caitlin Fleming, Associate Caitlin Fleming is an Associate on the Business Development Team where she develops and implements innovative solutions for financing social outcomes. Her portfolio includes investments in outcomes across the “cradle-to-career” spectrum including re-entry, workforce development, child welfare, and education. She crafts investment proposals and conducts benefit-cost analysis and due diligence to assess their feasibility. She also builds the partnerships and infrastructure needed to execute successful projects. Prior to joining Social Finance, Caitlin contributed to the design of successful social service models, growth and capital-raising strategies, and multi-million dollar government contract proposals for a variety of stakeholders including nonprofits, foundations, governments, and businesses. Most recently, she supported the White House Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation’s work to advance evidence- based practices, innovative financing tools, and public-private partnerships to maximize public resources and drive investment toward effective social solutions. She also helped innovative nonprofits develop the capacity to scale effectively as a founding member of AchieveMission’s Talent Initiative, a management consulting firm for the social sector. Caitlin is a StartingBloc Social Innovation Fellow, and previously served as a Coro Fellow in Public Affairs and AmeriCorps Resident in Social Enterprise. She graduated magna cum laude from Carleton College with a B.A. in Political Science and Fine Art. Jonathan Goodman, Senior Advisor A successful investor and Wall Street veteran, Jonathan advises Social Finance and its clients on complex capital markets issues, business strategy and quantitative methodology. Jonathan started his finance career at Goldman Sachs & Co. where he was part of Fischer Black’s original “Rocket Scientist Group” devising quantitative strategies in the currency and commodity markets. He subsequently moved to London where he built and managed Goldman Sachs’ European equity program trading, derivatives and risk arbitrage businesses. He returned to New York to join Steinhardt Partners LP where his responsibilities included investments in special situations, mortgage-backed securities, convertible bonds, Japanese warrants, high yield bonds, distressed securities, equity and fixed-income arbitrage, private transactions, insurance derivatives and other esoteric securities. He was named the youngest partner in that firm’s history, and after Michael Steinhardt’s retirement, he founded Concentric Capital Management LLC, an opportunistic global hedge fund that he has managed for the past 15 years. He is a graduate of Yale College and the University of Pennsylvania with degrees in Systems Engineering and Applied Mathematics. 153  154 TEAM Jane Hughes, Senior Consultant Jane drives the organization's thought leadership by helping to craft the Social Finance message and to develop research and analysis that helps fuel industry growth. She has inhabited both the financial world and the social development world, and is dedicated to bringing these forces together for the benefit of all stakeholders. Most recently, Jane was executive director of World Learning’s master’s degree program in sustainable development in Washington, D.C., where she also created and taught a course on microfinance and impact investment. She spent 17 years as an international finance professor at Brandeis University’s International Business School. Prior to her academic career, Jane was a vice president at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in New York, in the World Corporate Division. Jane has consulted, lectured, and published widely in the fields of international banking and finance; business, government, and the global economy; and international development. She co-wrote a leading textbook on international banking, and is currently working on a second edition of Separating Fools From Their Money: A History of American Financial Scandals (first edition, 2007). Jane graduated magna cum laude from Princeton University with a degree in French literature; she also has a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and an MBA from New York University Kate Manning Kennedy, Director of Communications Kate Manning Kennedy is the Director of Communications where she leads all external communications efforts for the organization including public relations, market education and partnership building. Kate develops marketing collateral to reach the organization's key audiences; maintains the brand and mission, vision, values; and executes multi-media marketing and communications activities in service of the organization's goals. Prior to joining Social Finance, Kate developed and implemented strategic communications campaigns throughout the private, public and nonprofit sectors. Most recently, she was a Director of Strategic Communications at the Glover Park Group, a leading public affairs firm in Washington, D.C., where she developed communications strategies for Fortune 100 companies, private equity firms and their portfolio companies, and other financial services clients. In this role, she specialized in platform development, internal communications, employee engagement, brand development, executive messaging, and crisis communications. Prior to the Glover Park Group, Kate served as a Communications Manager at Fidelity Investments where she focused on internal change management communications, executive communications and employee engagement strategies. Earlier in her career, Kate managed marketing and communications campaigns at TechFoundation, Inc., a nonprofit based in Cambridge, MA. She has also worked in the legislative office of Senator John Kerry and the 2004 Democratic National Convention Finance Committee. A graduate of Fairfield University, Kate majored in International Studies with concentrations in Political Science and Spanish. Rebecca Leventhal, Director Rebecca Leventhal is a Director on the Business Development Team where she collaborates with nonprofits and governments to identify and structure innovative ways to expand critical social service programs. She focuses on criminal justice and education financing products where she leads deal teams to structure and develop Social Impact Bonds and other innovative financings by building partnerships, performing due diligence, overseeing benefit-cost analyses and executing transaction negotiations. Additionally, she leads feasibility work to identify areas for future social investment. Prior to Social Finance, Rebecca held various roles in the public and private sector, specifically in government, politics, finance, and the nonprofit field. Rebecca spent 15 months working for Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, where she cultivated relationships and built partnerships with communities in over 30 states. Previously, Rebecca was an ambassador for President Clinton in support of his political, charitable, and personal work. Rebecca also spent time in Office Management and Budget and the U.S. State Department. Rebecca began her career at Merrill Lynch in the Municipal Finance department where she financed state and local government institutions and nonprofit facilities and later joined the Structured Finance department where she arranged secured transactions. Rebecca holds a JD from Harvard Law School and an AB in Social Studies from Harvard College.  TEAM Caitlin Reimers, Director Caitlin Reimers is a Director on the Capital Markets Team where she leads the financial structuring and capital raising activities to drive social impact at scale. She brings investment insight to the Product Development Team to create optimized financing solutions tailored to achieve our public and private partners’ desired social and financial outcomes for each transaction. Specifically, she drives the development of outcomes pricing, financial projections and risk/return models, builds relationships with investors, and manages the execution of outcomes-based financing transactions. Prior to Social Finance, Caitlin worked in strategic management consulting and asset management. While at Strategic Value Capital Management, she led due diligence and valuation analysis and made investment recommendations, including timing and portfolio weighting, to the fund manager. During her time at The Parthenon Group, Caitlin drove in-depth market research and best-practice analyses to provide strategic support for prominent education and financial services clients. Committed to supporting enterprise development in low-income communities, she has also had experience facilitating the structuring of offering memorandums for an impact investing fund and assessing microcredit loans for low-income women. From 2010-2012 she served as the pro-bono Director of Finance and Strategy for a start-up fair trade fashion organization. Caitlin holds an MBA with high distinction from Harvard Business School, where she was a Baker Scholar, and a BA with honors from The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Jill Scherer, Associate and Grants Manager Jill Scherer is an Associate and Grants Manager for Social Finance where she oversees the organization’s foundation deliverables and grant reporting. Jill also contributes to Social Impact Bond development through research of potential applications, with a particular focus on how outcomes-focused financing can address homelessness. In addition, she plays a key role in the organization’s fundraising efforts by researching and writing grant applications. Prior to joining Social Finance, Jill conducted research on how innovative finance can drive community and international development. Most recently, she was a Senior Research Analyst with the Milken Institute, an economic and financial think tank in Los Angeles. She co-authored several reports in support of Milken's Financial Innovations Labs, roundtables designed to identify financial solutions to social, economic and environmental challenges. Her reports spanned the topics of early childhood, health, and small business growth. Previously, she worked in the private sector at Charles River Associates, a business and economic consulting firm. Jill has a Masters Degree in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. in Economics from Wesleyan University. Nirav Shah, Director Nirav Shah is a Director on the Business Development Team where he leads the organization's efforts to create innovative financing mechanisms to advance healthcare policy and eliminate homelessness. Nirav develops collaborative partnerships with key, multi-sector stakeholders to deliver financial solutions that funnel investment capital into preventative programs, including chronic disease management, permanent supportive housing for the homeless and better coordinated care systems for the underserved. Prior to joining Social Finance, Nirav worked for the Financial Rescue Unit in the Office of Management and Budget within the Executive Office of the President. In this role he examined Federal policy and programmatic initiatives as part of the suite of Federal economic stabilization policies with a specific focus on housing policy. Earlier in his career, Nirav worked with Cambridge Associates as a Senior Hedge Fund Analyst where he analyzed fund performance and created hedge fund manager reviews for foundation, university, and high-net worth clients. Prior to Cambridge Associates Nirav worked at Bank of America where he developed new, innovative credit products to the Bank’s retail clients. Nirav holds a Masters of Public Affairs from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration with a concentration in Finance from Boston University. 155  156 TEAM Stephanie Shieh Stephanie provides administrative support to the Social Finance team. Prior to joining Social Finance, she worked as an admin istrative assistant at Open Circle, a Massachusetts-based non-profit working to implement social and emotional learning (SEL) curricula in elementary schools in the New England region and beyond. She has also served as a junior associate with the D.C. Public Schools' (DCPS) Central Office, where she supported summer school operations in the Office of College and Career Readiness. She graduated magna cum laude from Wellesley College with a B.A. in Biology and Education Studies. Joanna Vanden, Director of Operations Joanna Vanden is the Director of Operations where she oversees all day-to-day operations of the firm including budget and financial management, human resources, organization development, and general office management. Joanna plays a key role in executing business priorities in support of the organization’s goals. Prior to joining Social Finance, she was Director of Operations for the homeless services agency, HomeStart, Inc., and worked in fundraising for prisoner reentry services. In addition to her work at Social Finance, Joanna serves on the Board of Directors for Food For Free, a Cambridge-based nonprofit working to alleviate hunger in Greater Boston. Joanna graduated summa cum laude from Boston College with a B.A. in history, and holds an M.B.A. with high honors from Boston University. Gary Pelissier, Senior Analyst Gary Pelissier is a Senior Analyst on the Capital Markets Team where he develops market-based approaches to address complex contemporary social issues. Gary works closely with both the Capital Markets and Product Development Teams to structure innovative alternative financing strategies for high-quality, highly effective social service providers. Prior to joining Social Finance, Gary worked as an investment-banking analyst at Morgan Stanley in the Public Finance department. As the quantitative analyst on the Housing group, Gary was responsible for modeling the fixed income and mortgage cash flows for some of the Nation’s larges t and most sophisticated housing agencies, including MassHousing, Florida Housing, Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, State of New York Mortgage Agency, and New York City Housing Develo pment Corporation. During his time at Morgan Stanley, he helped structure and price over $2.5 billion of debt for his State HFA clients. Gary graduated magna cum laude with high honors from Harvard College in 2011 with A.B. in American History and Literature and a secondary field in Economics. Alissa Bonneau, Associate Extern Alissa Bonneau joins Social Finance as an extern from Bain & Company. As an Associate Extern on the Business Development Team, she researches and develops innovative solutions across sectors, with a specific focus on healthcare and homelessness. She conducts investment proposals, diligences new opportunities, and builds relationships with government, nonprofit, and investment partners. While at Bain, Alissa worked with clients across a variety of industries, conducting adjacency evaluation, organization redesign, operational improvement, growth strategy, and private equity due diligence. She also performed nonprofit case work through Inspire, Inc. She has done economic policy research for both the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy in Moscow, Russia. She received a B.A. with Honors in Economics from Stanford University, and served as the President of Stanford Nonprofits while on campus. Casey Littlefield, Advisor to the CEO Casey A. Littlefield is a Harvard Business School Leadership Fellow serving as Advisor to the CEO. Casey leads projects in business development and strategic planning to direct sustainable organizational growth. Committed to supporting efficient scaling and impact in the social sector, she has experie nce in management consulting, financial services, and the nonprofit sector. Before joining Social Finance, Casey was an Education Pioneers Fellow at Education Growth where she provided support for nonprofit organizations that offered compelling solutions to unmet needs in education. Prior to Education Growth, Casey worked at New Leaders where s he was responsible for strategic planning initiatives, including: revenue forecasting; financial scenario development; brand auditing and development; governance management; and communications. Earlier in her career, Casey assisted in the launch of Teach For India in Mumbai, and worked in management consulting at Oliver Wyman Group. Casey holds an MBA from Harvard Business School, and a B.A. in history from Yale University.  DISCLOSURE The information in this presentation is not a recommendation or an offer of any securities and is provided solely for your informational purposes. Any references to securities listed in this document are not intended to constitute a current or past recommendation, investment advice of any kind, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities or investment services. As described in this presentation, investments in Social Impact Bonds and any securities involve various risks, including potential loss of the invested principal. Investors should consider their individual financial objectives and investment risks when evaluating a security. Past performance is not a guarantee or indicator of future results or returns. In preparation of this presentation, the authors used sources that they believe to be reliable but cannot guarantee their accuracy or completeness. The content of this presentation is current as of the date of its writing without regard to the date on which you may access this information, and is subject to change at any time and for any reason. Social Finance does not provide tax advice. Accordingly, any discussion of US tax matters included in this presentation are not intended to be written or used, and cannot be used, in connection with the promotion, marketing, or recommendation by anyone (affiliated or not affiliated with Social Finance) of any security. Please consult your tax or financial professional about your specific situation. 157  158Confidential Draft- For Discussion Purposes Only Bringing Social Impact Bonds to New York City The City of New York Kristin Misner Chief of Staff to the Deputy Mayor For Health and Human Services & Family Services Coordinator What are Social Impact Bonds? • A Social Impact Bond is an investment vehicle designed to encourage private funding for promising social programs – Taps into new funding opportunities – Private investors fund a program’s delivery and operations • Public sector commits to paying the contractor only if improved social outcomes are achieved – Taxpayers only pay for interventions that work • Third-party evaluation confirms that outcomes have been achieved before investors can be paid 159 160 Addressing Adolescent Incarceration in NYC • Issue: those who enter jail as adolescents have a high likelihood of re- entering the system in the years following their release – nearly 50% of adolescents who leave Rikers return within one year • Program: Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (“ABLE”) – Provide evidence-based intervention in-jail and post release to 16-18 year olds in DOC custody at Rikers Island – The goal is to improve social skills, problem solving, self-control and impulse management. – Estimated roughly 3,000 adolescents served each year for 4 years – The Osborne Association and Friends of Island Academy will deliver the intervention through trained facilitators working closely with DOE and DOC staff – Part of Mayor’s Young Men’s Initiative and the City’s commitment to improving outcomes for young black and Latino men • Goal: to decrease participants’ likelihood of future criminal behavior and reincarceration • Budget: $2.4 million annually for 4 years Calculating the Savings 161 Analysis • • • • Estimate the number of program participants Baseline Bed Days Per Participant o Used DOC historical cohort analysis Effect of ABLE Program on Projected Bed Usage o Calculate projected number of bed usage with and without ABLE (create the counterfactual) Turned Bed Day Savings into Cost Savings Partners • Goldman Sachs funds the project’s delivery and operations through a $9.6 million loan to MDRC; • Bloomberg Philanthropies provides a $7.2 million grant to MDRC to guarantee a portion of the investment; • MDRC oversees the day-to-day implementation of the project and manages the Osborne Association and Friends of Island Academy, the two non-profit service providers that deliver the intervention; • The Vera Institute of Justice, an independent evaluator, determines whether the project achieves the targeted reductions in reincarceration; • The Department of Correction pays MDRC based on reduced re-admissions and the associated cost savings and MDRC then pays the private investor. 162 Overview of the NYC SIB Bloomberg Philanthropies Guarantees Loan $7.2 M Grant $9.6M Senior Loan Loan Principal and Interest Payments ($7.2M - $11.7M) Initial Investment $9.6M MDRC Manages Program and Investments Goldman Sachs Provides Loan Osborne Association & Friends of Island Academy Delivers Services Success Payments Based on Savings ($0 - $11.7M) CBT Intervention Vera Institute of Justice Measures Impact Youth on Rikers Island Receives Services Decrease in Recidivism NYC Department of Corrections Realizes Savings 163 = Flow of funds = Activity/Services  Payment Terms for Final Evaluation (4 Years of Investment) Reduction in Reincarceration Projected Long-Term City Net Savings ($)* City Payment to MDRC ($) ≥20.0% $20,500,000 $11,712,000 ≥16.0% $11,700,000 $10,944,000 ≥13.0% $7,200,000 $10,368,000 ≥12.5% $6,400,000 $10,272,000 ≥12.0% $5,600,000 $10,176,000 ≥11.0% $1,700,000 $10,080,000 ≥10.0% (breakeven) $ ≤ 1,000,000 $9,600,000 ≥8.5% $ ≤ 1,000,000 $4,800,000 164 * Excludes city savings used to continue funding program delivery for youth at Rikers . What are the Benefits? • Investing in outcomes to improve the lives of those in need • Government is able to preserve public resources for successful interventions while still encouraging innovation in a time of fiscal constraints – Savings can be recaptured and reinvested into a permanent funding stream for the program – Accelerate adoption and implementation of promising programs – Brings added discipline to measuring outcomes for government programs because there is an upfront agreement on how to measure success • Nonprofit providers receive a committed funding stream not subject to budget cuts • Can produce financial returns for private investors, who assume the risk while achieving a public good 165 166 APPENDIX D: October 7, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting • October 7, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting Agenda • October 7, 2013 Social Impact Bond Meeting Notes • October 2013 Survey Results Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Monday, October 7, 2013 9:00 am to 12:30 pm The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, UM SSW 306 W. Redwood Street, Baltimore Workgroup Meeting #3 Agenda Workgroup Goal: Report to the House Appropriations Committee on the merits of Social Impact Bonds (SIB) and their relevance and applicability to Maryland. Meeting Goals: To wrap up with an overview from a foundation involved in SIBs. The work group will review and share comments on the first draft of the report. 9:00-9:30 am 9:30-10:15 am Welcome. Discuss results of the second participant survey (Michelle Zabel) Mr. Jeff Schoenberg is an advisor to The J.B. and M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation, a Chicago-based philanthropy. Mr. Schoenberg principally advises members of the Pritzker family on grant making for The Children’s Initiative, a project of the J.B. and M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation which seeks to enhance the early learning capabilities of infants and toddlers, with a special focus on at-risk children. Mr. Schoenberg is a former Democratic member of the Illinois Senate, from 2003 to 2013, and prior to that served for 6 terms beginning in 1990 in the Illinois House of Representatives. Mr. Schoenberg will present on the role of foundations in SIBs, and provide specific information on the Salt Lake City PreK SIB. Break The work group will react to the first draft of the report (sent out by staff prior to the meeting), and list out final recommendations for the report to legislature. 10:15-10:30 am 10:30-12:30pm Comments/changes to the first draft due to Roann by Wednesday, October 14, 2013. SIB Summer Study Contact: Roann Tsakalas, rtsakalas@msde.state.md.us , (410)767-7802 167 Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Monday, October 7, 2013 9:00 am to 11:00 am The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, UM SSW 306 W. Redwood Street, Baltimore Workgroup Meeting #3 Workgroup Goal: Report to the House Appropriations Committee on the merits of Social Impact Bonds (SIB) and their relevance and applicability to Maryland. Meeting Goals: To wrap up with an overview from a foundation involved in SIBs. The work group will review and share comments on the first draft of the report. Meeting Notes: Members in Attendance: Michelle Zabel, The Institute for Innovation & Implementation, Chair Nathan W. Bowen, Department of Budget & Management Nancy Fitzgerald (for Marcella Franczkowski), Maryland State Department of Education Kathy Oliver (for Jeanne-Marie Holly), Maryland State Department of Education Farid Keshavarz, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services Stephen Schrieber-Stahl (for Dan Feller), Governor’s Office for Children Angela Lagdemeo Cabellon, Director of Policy and Planning, Department of Human Resources Miriam Shark, Annie E. Casey Foundation Margaret Williams, Maryland Family Network Terry Staudenmaier, Abell Foundation Rolf Grafwallner, Maryland State Department of Education Maura Dwyer (for Ilise Marrazzo), Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Observers: Caroline Boice, Louise Corwin Staff: John Spears, Roann Tsakalas, Deborah Harburger Welcome: Michelle welcomed the members to The Institute and introduced Mr. Jeff Schoenberg Mr. Jeff Schoenberg – Mr. Pritzker is interested in superior outcomes and is frustrated about the lack of resources available to change the life trajectories of disadvantaged children and their families. In order for programs to be candidates for a SIB, the program must demonstrate hard data that justifies cost avoidance for government. The total SIB transaction is a test of patience. The Salt Lake SIB started working years ago with the Kellogg Foundation and the Voices for Utah Children nonprofit to see if there was an alternative financing model available to fund PreK for at risk children. 168 Kellogg funded several years of research tracking of 3 and 4 year olds in high quality PreK programs. See http://www.utahchildren.org/issues/early-care-and-education and open “Summary: High Quality Preschool Closes the Achievement Gap and Reduces Special Education Costs for At-Risk Children.” If at risk children received high quality PreK experience, then approximately 25% were not tracked into special education. Over 5 years, there was a savings of $1.7m in special education costs. The research demonstrated quantifiable cost avoidance. With this evidence the partnership began, and counted as its members: • The Kellogg Foundation • The Voices for Utah Children – provides the research • The United Way of Salt Lake- oversees the intervention, and • The Granite County School District – provides training for PreK providers Private investors were brought to the SIB table - Goldman Sachs provided $4.6m loan, Mr. Pritzker provided $2.4m, the United Way provided $1m, and Salt Lake County Government invested $350k. United Way is the holder of the investment and acts as banker/financial intermediary. At first the state of Utah was going to be banker for the transaction. However, the Utah Legislature did not pass the bill to do this. The SIB project is providing high quality PreK to 3500 at risk children that otherwise would be on a PreK waitlist. United Way also oversees the project as an intermediary, and provided $90k in capital. Salt Lake County also has a financial stake in the project. The intervention is high quality and evidenced based. As a result of this project, there will be a greater focus on metrics to ascertain whether social interventions are working. The SIB contractual agreement creates a higher standard of data analysis. Utah State University is the research arm of the project and determines if the next quarterly payment should be made based on research demonstrating fidelity to the model and progress. There will be an estimated savings of $2700 per student in special education savings to the state of Utah. The expectation is to prove the project successful in year 1 and hope that the Utah legislature would pass the law to act as banker. For school year 2013-2014, Granite County enrolled a little shy of 600 at risk (defined as below the federal poverty line) children in PreK. The Granite Schools were ready to welcome these students. Goldman Sachs gets a success payment when the project is successful. Payment to Goldman Sachs is 90% of the avoided cost, and Mr. Pritzker gets a base interest rate. The success payment is paid after each child enters 6th grade and has avoided special education service. Goldman Sachs and Mr. Pritzker pay in quarterly based on the research intermediary reporting that the program is working satisfactorily. Administrator cost for the SIB is minimal because the school district is expanding an existing service. There was no cost for an intermediary to pull the financing of the SIB together in this model. Also, in other SIB models, there can be another intermediary to act as the banker for the project and oversee the researcher. Mr. Pritzker is in for 12 years. Mr. Schoenberg recommended speaking with Janis Dubno, the lead developer of the Salt Lake City pre-kindergarten project from the Voices for Children Utah, to learn about how measures were set for quarterly success. Michelle thanked Mr. Schoenberg for participating in the meeting via teleconference. 169 170 The minutes were reviewed silently and a motion was made to accept the minutes as written, and the motion carried. Deborah reviewed the summary report of the survey taken after the September 17th meeting. The draft report was reviewed by Deborah. It was requested that a chart with elements necessary for a SIB across the top and current projects (MA, UT, NYC, etc.) down the side be completed for the appendix of the report. The chart should be divided into Tier 1 (operating SIBs), Tier 2 (pre SIBs). Members wanted to be sure that report stressed the SIB negotiations process. It was suggested that more information on SIBs could be found at the National Finance Nonprofit Fund. One member shared that Minnesota has implemented a human capital performance bond. Funds to repay bond came from the State’s general obligation fund. This is a bond. The intermediary gets paid upfront by the State. One member requested that the report provide a positive view for any entity that wants to move forward with a SIB, and that the surveys give a true sense of things right now. Both surveys showed that workgroup members fall to the positive side on SIBs in Maryland. It was requested that the report mention Baltimore City’s application to Harvard to begin a SIB. It was requested that it be made clear that the Steps on page 5 of report do not have to happen in that order. Members took final survey and turned them in. The meeting adjourned at 11:00 am. The minutes were emailed out to the workgroup on October 8, 2013 for comments, and members emailed in changes. The minutes became final on October 17, 2013. Social Impact Bond Summer Study 2013 Participant Survey Results October 7, 2013 This survey was issued to all Social Impact Bond (SIB) Summer Study Workgroup members and designed to serve as a check-in with all participants to identify current thinking about and questions regarding SIBs in general and in Maryland. A similar survey had been administered in prior to the September SIB meeting, and this survey will be re-administered after the October SIB Workgroup Meeting. Did you attend the second meeting of the SIB Summer Study Workgroup (Tuesday, September 10, 2013)? There were 11 respondents; 9 attended the second meeting of the SIB Summer Study Workgroup on Tuesday, September 10, 2013. (All participants have received materials regardless of attendance at the meeting.) What information about SIBs (either from the meeting or the resources shared) have surprised you or challenged your ideas about SIBs? (Comments in italics are from the October survey; non-italicized comments are from the September survey.) • I thought Steve Liebman's checklist of what makes a "ripe" opportunity to consider a SIB was very useful. • Extent to which SIBs are being used or studied across the country • I have a better understanding that a project must really be a good fit for a SIB. Not all projects would lend themselves to SIBs because of a variety of factors such as the timeframe being too soon to show impact results before the funding ends. The example of Rikers Island was a good one as it does take time to change the culture of a person. • I was surprised at the short time horizon for an ideal SIB (presenters stated it to be about 4-5 years), as many social programs have a much longer time horizon for realizing benefits. I also had not considered the fact that SIB could be a way to work around policy/budget silos in departments. • The broad range of issues that people want to address through SIBs; the fact that private investors are interested in investing in social programs; the complicated financing mechanisms; Prof. Liebman's statement that there is a lack of solid evidence of effectiveness for most prevention programs. • (1) It's good to have a large bond because of all the work it takes to put it together. (2) A lot of SIBs do not fund evidence-based practices and therefore are riskier. (3) Private and/or public subsidies or guarantees are essential. • Presentation by Dr. Salamon about the variety of new financing options through the private market • The fiscal analysis done by the Department of Legislative Services is sobering. 171 • I was surprised to discover the breadth of literature in this area as it is relatively new to me. I was also interested to learn of the existing SIBs and their structure. • I like the model in concept, am still trying to understand the complexities of the financing mechanism and am concerned about what sound like high legal and transactional costs of creating a SIB. Also, if an investor requires a guarantee, as in the NYC Rikers Island SIB, that would make it more expensive and more difficult to put in place. • It was a wonderful learning experience for me. I was only vaguely familiar with social impact bonds and I learned a lot about the types of initiatives around SIB. The resources provided a great background. • There is often significant private capital spurring development like the Bloomberg example in NY Questions about SIBs: I have questions about SIBs in relation to: Other (please state):         4 Understanding what the best use of a SIB is in Maryland -- which agency/foundation would be interested in funding which intervention, and how the savings would be counted and the repayment made. I'm interested in a specific possible case for Maryland Max Value September Response Answer October Response Determining the population focus Organizing the financing for the SIB Recouping savings from the SIB Challenges to developing and implementing a SIB Benefits of implementing a SIB 3 8 4 4 7 5 5 1 1 3 No Change 7 No Change Decreased Increased Decreased Decreased (11 respondents in September; 9 respondents in October) September Responses: October Responses: Average Standard Value    Deviation Based on the information you have received to-date, on a scale of 1-10, do you think a SIB could work for Maryland in the next few years? (1=SIBs are not at all feasible or realistic for Maryland in the next few years; 10=SIBs could definitely be implemented in Maryland to implement in the next few years) Responses 3.00            8.00                    1.86           9 172 Min Value Max Value 5.22 Min Value Average Standard Value    Deviation Responses 4.00            8.00                    1.35           11 5.27  (DBM, DHMH, DHR, DJS, GOC, MSDE). Six (6) respondents said that they were State Agency October Responses for Average Standard Value Deviation State Agency 4.00                7.00                     1.17             6 Employees: October Responses for Min Value Max Value 4.83 Average Standard Value    Deviation Responses Non-State Agency Employees: Please explain your rating. 4.00                8.00                     1.48             5 5.80 • All the technical aspects are doable. The question is leadership. Also, whether there is the will and capacity to tackle problems with enough room to reduce costs to put the costs and benefits in balance. • If one or more agencies is interested in funding a program that has not been funded in the state operating budget, this is an opportune way to do so. • If Maryland decided to go with SIBs for specific, well-defined projects, I would suggest that it be a pilot or two first. • In a time of budget constraints, it will be difficult to convince either the Administration or Legislature to provide funding to such a new concept that has few examples and no proven track record. I think that legislation might be passed to enable the State to enter into SIB contracts, but a significant amount of study will be needed in a given project area before a SIB could be conceived of in Maryland. • It is evident that part of the success of SIBs has to do with leadership. Given that we are on the cusp of election season and that this is a very new initiative, I can foresee that timing would be key. • Still too many moving parts and actually developing the legislative financing vehicle are barriers 173 The October survey asked respondents whether they were employees of a State Agency employees. Min Value Max Value Responses  • A clear plan would need to be developed with clear outcomes. Also, staff would need to be designated for this implementation - this isn't something that can be added to someone's job duties. • With the collaboration of agencies on a focused population it appears to be very possible. • I think the model has good potential but there doesn't seem to be anyone championing this in any state agency, we don't have a specific target population or specific intervention identified, and other priorities are likely to consume the attention of the agencies and the legislature next session so it may be difficult to get anyone to focus on this. If it is going to move forward we need someone at a high level who is an advocate for a specific SIB. • The mechanisms that allow for this type of innovation take time • While SIBs are clearly doable, they are employed to fund projects that government should be undertaking anyway, with private inducements if necessary, and they are expensive and difficult to assemble. I sensed that our budget and legislative colleagues recognized that, too, and their backing would be helpful, if not essential, to get a SIB off the ground. What specific programs and initiatives might be relevant for a SIB or pre-SIB? (Think about specific projects, populations, and grant activities, including those that are within one agency and those that are interagency.) No examples were provided in the survey. The following list is generated from the free response section of the survey. Early Childhood/Pre-K/Home Visiting: 8 Child Health (e.g. Early Childhood Mental Health Expansion, Pediatric & Primary Care Integration, Asthma): 3 Juvenile Justice: 5 Prisoner Re-Entry/Recidivism Reduction: 2 Child Welfare: 1 Elder Care: 1 Hunger: 1 Housing First: 1 Other Comments: • It sounds like programs with clear objectives and 'fast' outcomes are better than longer term goals. • I was intrigued by Dr. Zachik's thought that we try a multi-disciplinary, comprehensive, integrated intervention (perhaps geographically focused?) targeted to very young children and their families. Though complicated to plan and implement, and the big pay-off coming only over time, something big and bold like this might be fitting for the tremendous complexity of the instrument itself. 174 recommendation to the General Assembly? • Where would this rank on the Governor's priority list? • Thank you for what you have provided so far. I have learned much about this topic. • I think the development of a few proposed project areas would be highly useful. As would be more analysis of what specific Legislation will be needed to enable the creation of SIBs in Maryland. • Ways that SIBs are used to enhance or augment existing services- without cutting traditional funding mechanisms • What if any state agencies are interested in pursuing a SIB, and what specific population do they want to target and what outcome do they hope to achieve? • I know we don't have to come up with a specific recommendation, but that would be MOST helpful to my thinking! 175 What additional information would you like to receive to assist with the development of the